DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 158 309 CS 204 293

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TITLE Television and Terrorism: Professionalism Not Quite the Answer.
PUB DATE Aug 78
NOTE 70p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (61st, Seattle, Washington, August 13-16, 1978); Survey may not reproduce due to small type

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$3.50 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Administrator Attitudes; Broadcast Industry; *Conflict Resolution; *Crime; Freedom of Speech; Guidelines; *Journalism; *News Reporting; Press Opinion; Questionnaires; Surveys; Technological Advancement; *Television; Violence
IDENTIFIERS Professionalism; *Terrorism

ABSTRACT

The responsibilities and role of the broadcast media in reporting acts of terrorism are examined in this paper. The paper first discusses such topics as new types of television equipment that permit easy and instantaneous coverage of fast-breaking news; television coverage of two 1977 cases in which persons were held hostage by terrorists; and discussions among broadcast journalists of such issues as whether terrorist strategy should be reported in detail, whether terrorist events should be covered live, and whether reporters should become intermediaries. It then lists CBS and UPI (United Press International) guidelines for coverage of terrorist acts and discusses the issue of the professionalism of journalists, as explored in research studies and in cases involving newspaper employees' right to form bargaining units. The paper also reports results of a survey of television station news directors' attitudes toward and experiences with self-regulatory codes, attitudes toward statements related to the controversy, professionalism and professional autonomy, and probable behavior in terrorist/hostage situations. Finally, suggestions are presented for dealing with the controversial issues. The questionnaire mailed to television news directors, and tables of their responses, are included. (GW)

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Radio-TV Journalism Division

TELEVISION AND TERRORISM: PROFESSIONALISM NOT QUITE THE ANSWER

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Presented to the Radio-TV Journalism Division, Association for Education in Journalism Annual Convention, Seattle, Washington, August, 1978.

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TELEVISION AND TERRORISM:
PROFESSIONALISM NOT QUITE THE ANSWER

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The first quarter of 1977 was more than usually challenging for a small number of television journalists. The challenge came in deciding how to cover a series of domestic terrorism-hostage incidents with relatively new television newsgathering equipment permitting those incidents to be covered in real time and with greater ease than previously possible. Problems started on February 8 when Anthony Kiritsis, a small-time Indianapolis land developer, took mortgage company president Richard Hall hostage for 63 hours. The Kiritsis episode ended February 10 with a rambling, obscenity-filled press conference -- a shotgun still attached to Hall's neck -- prior to the hostage's release. Indianapolis TV stations covered the conference live; excerpts of that coverage appeared on all three networks.

On Valentine's day, Frederick Cowan held captives briefly in a New Rochelle, NY factory and then committed suicide. On March 7, Cory Moore took two captives, a young woman and a police captain, in the Cleveland suburb of Warrensville Heights. They were released two days later only after President Carter promised to give Moore a phone call. On the date of that call, March 9, members of the Hanafi Muslim sect invaded three Washingon DC buildings. They took 134 hostages and held them through March 11. In all of these instances, TV coverage -- by both local stations and major TV networks -- was extensive. Not surprisingly, such intensive coverage of two months of terrorism stirred up old controversies about how broadcasting, especially television, should treat hostage-taking, terrorism and civil disturbance.[1]

Public controversy about such things is nothing new. In the 1960's, television journalists were criticized for their coverage of airplane hijackings and civil disorders associated with race relations and the Vietnam war.[2] The major criticism was that overly extensive TV coverage encouraged -- even taught -- further terrorism. By the time of the Kiritsis and Hanafi controversies, it was obvious that similar public criticism was building again. A Gallup Poll conducted March 25-28, 1977 found that a majority of those polled, 64%, believed that terrorist coverage incited more terrorist acts. Despite this belief, however, opinion was rather evenly divided on whether media were placing too much emphasis on terrorism coverage. Nationally, 47% thought there was over-emphasis, but 50% believed such reporting "necessary to keep people fully informed."[3] So, the public was concerned about the effects of terrorist coverage, but divided about what to do about it. Just about the same thing was true of the broadcast journalism community.

Television's work in covering acts of terrorism is, by nature, highly visible and readily subject to criticism. Shortly after the Hanafi Muslim siege, UN Ambassador Andrew Young suggested that terrorism was contagious and that "'a lot of these phenomena' are the result of publicity they are given. 'In a sense, we're advertising to neurotic people' that the way to get attention is 'to do something suicidal and ridiculous.'" Young claimed that "this kind of crime would not have been known about (in California, where he was when he made these remarks) when the First Amendment was written. It should have died in Washington, D.C." He then suggested that the First Amendment "be 'clarified by the Supreme Court in the light of the power of the mass media'"[4] Within days,

Young's boss, President Carter, disassociated himself from Young's position. According to White House Press Secretary Jody Powell the President...

> recognizes the complexity of the problem and frankly has no easy solution in mind. He sees this as a problem that should be addressed by the news media as a powerful and responsible institution in our society. He has no desire to seek legislation or to otherwise impose a solution and hopes those who make news decisions will themselves determine the definite boundaries of legitimate coverage.[5]

Carter's plea for media self-regulation, rather than governmental action to "clarify" the First Amendment or to enact some other legal solution to the terrorism-hostage controversy, was the preferred solution to the problem among most of the television journalism community. US media have a long history of self-regulation, partly because while the First Amendment is a powerful barrier to many governmental actions affecting the press it is not absolute.[6] As long ago as 1941, the Commission on Freedom of the Press -- parent of the so-called "social responsibility theory of the press" -- urged media organizations to police themselves, accept their social responsibilities and engage in self-regulation, with a warning that failure to do so might lead to more active governmental intervention to assure that journalists met social needs.[7] Broadcasting, a licensed medium, has more of a history of direct governmental regulation than the print media, but it, too, has a substantial history of self-regulation. The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) adopted a "Code of Ethics" in the prehistory of radio, 1929.[8] The Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) promulgated a "Code of Broadcast News Ethics" in 1966.[9] As is true of many self-regulatory codes, however, a major purpose of many provisions of these codes in broadcasting has been to ward off threatened or probable direct governmental regulation.[10] With powerful politicians

at the Federal and state level talking about changes in the law to deal with terrorism-hostage coverage, it was to be expected that industry leaders would press instead for self-regulation. That may be, of course, the most desirable eventual course of social action, but it should be chosen only on sound grounds. The argument over self-regulation as the answer to criticisms of terrorism-hostage coverage, however, became repeatedly intertwined with claims by journalists that it was the appropriate response because of their professionalism. There are, however, -- as will be shown shortly -- sociological and legal reasons for not deferring more direct governmental action on that particular basis.

Before discussing professionalism further, it is vital to note why terrorism-hostage coverage in early 1977 posed new problems to TV journalists, since there had been some previous TV coverage of terrorist activities. U.S. media had covered foreign terrorism, often involving hostages, for years; the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, bombings in London, Belfast and Dublin associated with the religious warfare of Northern Ireland and, of course, the many acts of terrorism associated with disorder in the Middle East.[11] Media behavior here was frequently criticized, as was coverage of perhaps the major disorganizing force in American society of the last decades -- the war in Vietnam -- a war one critic called "the living-room war."[12] There was something different about the events of early 1977, however. Basically it was that news coverage of those events was in two ways more immediate than previous reportage.

One way things were more immediate was spatial: terrorism-hostage taking was coming close to home. There were, of course, previous incidents of domestic US terrorism and hostage taking prior to 1977, but the closely

compacted events in Indianapolis, Washington D.C. and elsewhere in February and March of that year suggested that the living-room war might be going domestic. Native dissidents, malcontents, crackpots and criminals seemed to have learned some lessons from international models. A spectacular example of this coming home of political terrorism tactics involving hostages -- and one of the first great challenges to TV coverage of such things -- came in 1973 and 1974 with the abduction of Patty Hearst. The kidnapping of Hearst, granddaughter of "the" William Randolph Hearst, was naturally a "media event" from the start. Audio tapes were sent by the abductors to radio stations, their manifestos were printed in newspapers. Television stations ran films which appeared to show Ms. Hearst taking part in a bank robbery. For months, law enforcement agencies seemed unable to capture Hearst and her Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) comrades. Then, on May 17, 1974, the case turned into a classic case study of the problems faced by TV journalists in covering domestic terrorism with contemporary broadcast equipment.

On that date, police cornered members of the SLA in a small stucco home in central Los Angeles. A shootout occurred; the home was set ablaze. Desperate SLA members, some feared Patty herself, fought it out with police until they eventually died in the burning home. The shootout --firefight -- was watched live by millions. KNXT, the CBS owned and operated station in Los Angeles, originated live coverage shared with two other network owned and operated stations, KNBC and KABC, plus three VHF and two UHF independent stations in Los Angeles.[13] It was all possible because of then new playthings of the broadcast industry, Electronic Newsgathering (ENG) equipment.[14]

Television had the ability to do "remotes" from the field for years.

Remote trucks go back to the late 1930's. Until the mid 1970's, however, a remote was a cumbersome and necessarily pre-planned process. Equipment was bulky and costly to operate, so remotes were reserved mostly for events that could be anticipated in advance like political conventions and sports. It was just not readily possible to do remote coverage of fast-breaking news. For that film was more appropriate -- but film took time to process and edit for television.

In about 1973, however, three new pieces of TV equipment moved from the laboratory to production and revolutionized TV journalism technology. That revolution challenged existing TV ethics and practices. The equipment was simple: (1) small, light video cameras ("minicams"), (2) light, battery-powered video tape recorders and (3) -- the real technological breakthrough -- a device called the time-base corrector which converted the output of the light-weight video recorder into a picture with sufficient stability to be broadcast. With just these three pieces of equipment, news coverage could be speeded up substantially by eliminating the time for film processing. With two more pieces of equipment -- a portable microwave transmitter and receiver unit -- images could be transmitted directly from field to studio and, if desired, broadcast live. TV news had at last become as instantaneous with images as radio had long been with sound.

In September, 1974 a CBS owned and operated station in St. Louis, KMOX-TV, became the nation's first all ENG station.[15] Other network owned stations followed, and were soon joined by larger stations not owned by networks. The switch to new equipment was expensive, and it was clear that first generation equipment would soon be outdated, but TV journalists were anxious for the immediacy the equipment gave and those

investments were quickly made.[16] In 1973 and 1974, ENG was a game for the affluent. By early 1977, however, over 75% of commerical TV broadcast stations had ENG cameras and video recorders, although not all had the microwave equipment needed for live transmission.[17] Further ENG growth can be expected: a survey of station executives in early 1978 about immediate equipment purchase plans found "a pretty clear pattern of interest in what appears to be a plan for quick expansion of live ENG capability. Broadcasters across the country quickly ticked off a selection of 'very interesteds' in ENG cameras, (95 percent), microwave for ENG (71 percent), time base correctors (82 percent), frame synchronizers (74 percent)."[18] Before long, ENG should penetrate into even the smallest of TV markets, making ethical and legal questions about its use a matter of broad industry and social concern. The use of ENG in covering the events of early 1977 showed how complex and difficult to resolve those questions could be.

Two of the 1977 hostage-taking situations merit substantial discussion, not just because of the TV coverage they received, but mainly because these two incidents, more than others in the same time period, became the focus of intensive study and criticism within the TV journalism community. These are the Anthony Kiritsis case in Indianapolis and the Hanafi Muslim siege in Washington, DC.

The Kiritsis case started shortly after 8:00 a.m., February 8, 1977 when Anthony G. (Tony) Kiritsis, 44, kidnapped Indianapolis mortgage company executive Richard O. Hall, 42, from Hall's downtown Indianapolis office.[19] Kiritsis crudely attached a sawed-off shotgun to Hall's neck, rigged to go off if Kiritsis was rushed, and marched the executive more than four blocks in near-zero weather until he commandeered a police car

and forced Hall to drive to Kiritsis' allegedly booby-trapped apartment. The bizarre street scenes were covered thoroughly, in some cases live, by TV and print camerapersons.

For the next 63 hours, Hall was held captive in the apartment. Later the News Director of one Indianapolis station reported that his station alone broadcast 29 separate reports, many interrupting regular programming, during Hall's captivity.[20] Kiritsis believed the mortgage company had cheated and misled him in connection with his efforts to develop a small shopping center. Most of his demands related to forgiveness of a loan and apology by the company. The company quickly granted a cautious apology -- broadcast on TV stations -- and Kiritsis then began to bargain for immunity from state and federal prosecution.

Immunity from state charges was offered by the Marion County Prosecutors Office as early as the evening of February 9th, through a televised statement, as well as in written form, to Kiritsis and his attorneys, but the problem of possible federal charges was more difficult. Federal officials repeatedly refused to promise immunity. Later, Attorney General Griffin Bell would say that he would never make a false promise of immunity even to free a hostage. At 7:35 p.m. on February 10th, however, Deputy Marion County Prosecutor George Martz went on all Indianapolis network affiliated TV stations to announce that it was the prosecutors' belief that no federal laws had been broken. Shortly after 10:00 p.m., to the surprise of police and media, Kiritsis emerged with his hostage, the shotgun still attached to Hall's neck. Kiritsis headed for the lobby of the apartment complex where police and media had maintained a command center. There Tony conducted a rambling, obscenity filled press conference which demonstrated, as had many other events throughout the

affair, that in many ways, Indianapolis media were just about as much a captive as was Hall.[21] One Indianapolis newspaper described the wild scene vividly:

> With a shotgun still taped to Hall's ear, Kiritsis went on television last night to make further demands.
>
> Hall stood by numbly in the glare of the television lights as Kiritsis launched into a wild tirade against Hall and Meridian Mortgage Company, which had financed Kiritsis' purchase of a 17-acre Westside property.
>
> Kiritsis in a rambling and incoherent speech repeated his long catalogue of complaints against Meridian Mortgage. During the entire time, the gun was pointed at Hall's head, jerking first to the left and then to the right.
>
> The flushed Hall stood stone-faced, his lips compressed. His hands were handcuffed in front of him.
>
> Kiritsis was surrounded by 100 policemen and newsmen. Frequently he called out for his brother, Jimmie.
>
> Martz said: "We thought of everything but this."[22]

"This" lasted for 23 minutes. It was carried, "live and in its entirety" by two of three Indianapolis network affiliated TV stations. Kiritsis thought it was being carried nationally, and tried during his remarks to make sure he was "on all three" networks. As the Indianapolis Star noted with supreme understatement, it was a performance that "defied comparison as a media event."[23] During the 23 minutes, Kiritsis vilified Hall and the mortgage company, hugged and praised police and law enforcement officials for their handling of the event, called himself a "God damned national hero," complained that some TV coverage had been defamatory -- "There are going to be some Goddamn retractions" -- read a formal list of grievances against the company, praised Fred Heckman, news director for radio station WIBC -- with whom Kiritsis had had several phone conversations -- and asked viewers at home to send him postcards. Always there was the real possibility that he might pull the trigger, treating Americans to a sight reminiscent of

the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas in 1963. In the midst of his praise of police and friends, one onlooker remarked "watch out. He's saying good-bye to his friends and that shotgun is probably going to go off."[24] Near 11:00 p.m., however, Kiritsis and Hall went to another room, negotiated briefly with police and, about 11:15, the gun was removed from Hall's neck. Kiritsis was arrested, and police disclaimed the immunity promise as being made under duress and of no value. Kiritsis was tried, but found not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury was shown video tapes of the press conference.

The episode attracted modest national media attention. Kiritsis' press conference was not carried live on the networks, as he thought, but between February 8 and February 11, there was something on every network's evening news broadcast each night about the Indianapolis affair.[25] Over those four days, ABC gave the story greatest play -- a total of 7 minutes and 50 seconds. NBC was close behind with 7 minutes, 30 seconds. CBS devoted only 5 minutes, 40 seconds to the story. On February 11, all ran video excerpts from the press conference, but edited that coverage. It was a different matter, of course, in Indianapolis where coverage was live.

Indianapolis broadcast media had been involved from the beginning. The morning after the abduction -- February 9th -- Kiritsis telephoned Fred Heckman of radio station WIBC at 6:22 a.m. to explain his case. Over the next few days, Heckman had seven phone conversations with the gunman and eventually joined police to negotiate the final release. At that time, Heckman deliberately ceased to function as a broadcast journalist -- he even refused to give information to newspersons working for him.[26] Kiritsis was heard both live and taped on WIBC. He monitored the station as well, for on the night of Hall's release there was a moment of panic for police when Kiritsis misinterpreted a WIBC news report as indicating

that the bomb squad was about to rush the apartment. Within minutes, WIBC put Tony's brother on the air to convince him that such was not the case.

In the later stages of the affair, however, it was mainly TV that became the controversial broadcast medium. All three Indianapolis network affiliates had live cameras available when Kiritsis began his tirade. At about 10:20 p.m. on February 10th, all three stations broke into network programming to bring live coverage from the apartment complex. As an Indianapolis Star TV critic described it, "suddenly the air went blue in living color."[27] Two of the stations, WISH (CBS) and WRTV (NBC) stayed with the conference from beginning to end. The other station, WTHR (ABC) pulled away after about 5 minutes, apologized for the language, announced that the material was not suitable for broadcast, promised to keep viewers informed -- and returned to The Streets of San Francisco. Later the General Manager of that station explained that for him it was a "problem of giving exposure to someone who is distraught, or what have you...we felt all he wanted was publicity...At one point, we felt he was going to pull that trigger."[28] The News Director of the same station explained "We bailed out...We would not go back until the gun was down and there was no possibility of Hall being killed on the air."[29] The other Indianapolis affiliates considered the story so newsworthy that it had to be covered despite the blue language and the risk of Hall's on-air murder.[30]

Although there had been controversial aspects of media coverage of the event from its beginning, the coverage of the press conference became the most disputed aspect of all and started a substantial discussion

within the TV journalism community about "proper" behavior in such situations. Wayne Vriesman, then President of RTNDA, used his column in the March, 1977 issue of RTNDA's house organ -- RTNDA Communicator -- to suggest to his members that they "set your guidelines now. Don't wait for the event to happen, because you probably won't have time enough to give all the ramifications proper consideration." The column noted that "we are going through a predictable stage of growing pains with ENG where technology is interfering with good news judgment...Let's keep news in proper perspective. With the live capability now, it's very easy to fall into the overkill trap."[31]

Vriesman was more prophetic than he wished, for on March 9, 1977 another terrorist-hostage situation occurred that attracted greater national media attention, probably because it involved more hostages, a quasi-political motivation and happened in Washington, DC -- the networks' backyard. At about 11:00 a.m. that morning, members of the Hanafi Muslim sect raided three Washington, DC buildings: the B'nai B'rith headquarters, the Islamic Center and the District Building (city hall). Soon 134 persons were held hostage. They would be detained for 39 hours. As Broadcasting, television's main trade journal, noted, broadcast coverage went full force:

> ...journalists were coming in from across the nation and from foreign countries. NBC-TV assigned 18 minicam crews to the story. Like other networks, it had the manpower and facilities from its Washington bureaus readily accessible. NBC used eight crews based in Washington, one from its owned WRC-TV there and brought in personnel and equipment from Chicago, New York and Burbank, Calif. NBC Washington news director Ed Fouhy said about 100 NBC persons were assigned to the story but wouldn't estimate the costs of the coverage. At WTOP-TV Washington, news director Jim Snyder gave a ballpark figure for his station's expenses at $70,000 - $75,000.[32]

Huge amounts of network prime-time news time were spent on the Hanafi siege. It led off all three network evening news programs for three straight nights.[33] If commentary on the news coverage itself is excluded, total network time figures for those three nights are: NBC, 35 minutes, 50 seconds; ABC, 26 minutes, 20 seconds; and CBS, 21 minutes, 50 seconds. Over the same three days, each network had available the following total amounts of time for news presentation in evening news programs: NBC, 67 minutes, 20 seconds; ABC, 65 minutes, 50 seconds; CBS, 70 minutes. Obviously each network devoted a substantial proportion of available prime news time to the Hanafi siege: NBC, 53.22%; ABC, 40.00% and CBS, 31.19%. The story clearly dominated all else.

Fortunately, the Hanafi siege ended with but one casualty, that of a young Black reporter for the Howard University radio station, WHUR. He seemed to be killed not because he was a reporter, but simply because he startled leaders of the District Building occupation force at the wrong time. On Friday, March 11, Abdul Khaalis, the Hanafi leader, and his followers surrendered with most of their demands unmet. Controversy about the behavior of broadcast journalists in covering this event continues, however.

Like Heckman in Indianapolis, WTOP-TV anchorman Max Robinson established contact with the hostage taker, Khaalis, and served as the vehicle through which Khaalis transmitted his major demands.[34] The propriety of such a role by a journalist became the subject of substantial later debate. As in the Kiritsis case, there was in the Hanafi siege a point where news coverage enraged the hostage taker, this time a report on WTOP(AM) early in the siege which called the terrorists "Black Muslims." Khaalis, incensed at being mistaken for those he

thought responsible for the murder of his family, called the station demanding an immediate apology or "I'm going to kill someone and throw him out the window."[35] The station's apology was immediate. Throughout the siege, police feared that TV cameras would reveal the positions of officers and sharpshooters positioned to storm the building if necessary or, in general, reveal too much about police negotiating strategy.[36]

Things were quieter for the remainder of the year. Working journalists, however, sensed that their performance had clearly been controversial and was perhaps deficient. Musings by public officials like Andrew Young spurred private media self-criticism. A bit of such self-criticism had been conducted rather publicly early in the Hanafi siege on March 10, for example, when the CBS Evening News carried a 2 minute, 20 second commentary by Eric Sevareid in which Sevareid admitted that the press was being held captive to some extent by the Hanafi. The next night, March 11, Walter Cronkite himself delivered a 50 second comment defending the coverage as necessary to keep people informed. On March 15, Sevareid's commentary was again about the reporting difficulties, but by this time he was more actively defending broadcasters from Young's comments and observing that almost any communication will have an effect and may be "contagious." On the next day, CBS included an interview of Cronkite by CBS Correspondent Dan Rather in its short-lived People magazine clone, "Who's Who." Cronkite defended the need of the press to just report events that happen, and downplayed self-censorship arguing that "all that does is lead to rumor, speculation, to doubt that the press is telling the whole story under any circumstances... If we cover up stories under any circumstance, the public has every right to believe that we cover them up

under any (sic.) circumstance. And if we cover up at all, then the whole belief, reliance upon the press is gone."[37]

Much of the public ventilation of criticism of broadcast performance in terrorism-hostage situations was defensive. The self-examination, however, was often more critical with a greater willingness to admit problems in more private and closed circles. Some of that "in-house" criticism appeared in print. Quill magazine, published by Sigma Delta Chi, Society of Professional Journalists, devoted eight pages to three articles on the controversy in its July-August, 1977 issue -- itself just 39 pages long. All three were moderately critical of recent press performance; one was written by a former Hanafi hostage, and also a journalist, who suggested that news competitiveness had placed hostages' lives in undue danger.[38] Another stressed that journalists should be better trained to understand and cover terrorists.[39] The third suggested that formal guidelines and more thoughtful study of the problem was needed.[40]

The major forum for self-appraisal of TV's performance, however, was not articles in magazines but rather the meeting of journalistic organizations and associations across the country in subsequent months. Broadcast journalist conventions became variants of the joke about South-Seas' families consisting of mother, father, two children and an anthropologist. For months, every gathering of broadcast journalists included a terrorist-hostage panel discussion with a news director who had been involved in such coverage (Indianapolis or Washington experience much preferred), a police representative, a lawyer and nearly always a police psychologist or psychiatrist. Just two weeks after the Hanafi siege, the Washington chapter of RTNDA sponsored such a panel.[41] Another was held three months later at the St. Louis annual convention of the Associated Press Broadcasters.[42]

Still another such panel was held three months later at the September annual meeting of RTNDA in San Francisco.[43]

There were quite diffuse discussions, usually just brief presentations by the panelists followed by question and answer sessions. They are hard to summarize, for more than anything else they revealed how divided the broadcast journalism community was on how to improve hostage coverage, or for that matter, whether improvement was needed. Psychologists and psychiatrists most often seemed to feel that the press was unduly ignorant of the possible effects of certain types of reporting upon often unstable terrorists, counseled against revealing terrorist names or demands unless absolutely unavoidable, and advised that terrorist strategy not be reported in detail. They suggested, instead, that coverage focus on the low success rate of terrorists and on the effects of being held hostage upon the captives. Sometimes, as in San Francisco, psychologists accused the press of engaging in an "excessive act of public revelation," and then trying to formulate reforms of their behavior based on limited data gathered from one or two well-known hostage situations.[44] Media representatives were frequently urged to cooperate with social scientists in conducting careful research of the effects of the media in hostage situations. Caution was urged until the research findings were in.

Police representatives often took conflicting views. One group seemed to propose rather direct controls upon newsgathering such as restricting location and use of cameras and limiting press to only a few official sources.[45] Other police officials, however, seemed to be taking cues from a study published by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1977 and professed a general willingness to provide press members with more information if only some attention would be

paid to police advice about how to treat the developing story.[46] Even these police officers, however, warned journalists that they would not always provide every bit of information to a journalist that that journalist might desire.[47] They were particularly concerned, for two reasons, about journalists who telephoned terrorists for interviews. First, such interview seeking was sometimes so intense that phone lines became jammed making it impossible for police to communicate with terrorists. Second, some police representatives and some psychologists claimed that numerous interviews with terrorists often upset the terrorist psychologically or at least made negotiation more difficult. One psychologist traced many of his negotiating problems to the effects of phone interviews upon Khaalis and his followers.[48]

Perhaps the best way to summarize press participation in these panels is just to list many of the questions they presented to panelists. Should events like these be covered live or could they -- should they -- be delayed? Would rumor spread if reporting were delayed? Could failure to report disorder or trouble mean that others might innocently wander into dangerous places? Could any self-censorship or voluntary news blackout be effective in a competitive situation? Should demands of terrorist be disclosed? Should they be broadcast by the terrorists themselves? Would they have to be broadcast if the terrorist made that a demand?

There were questions about the roles of reporters. Should they become intermediaries? Should they withold information at police request? Broadcast false information at police request? Limit themselves to official police sources only? What kinds of reporters were needed

anyway -- only the most experienced or could anybody cover a terrorist-hostage situation? There were technical questions. Would pooling of equipment help reduce confusion? Could it be done? What should field reporting conditions be? How much communication was needed between field reporters and producers at studios? Finally, there were more philosophical questions. Was competition having a negative effect on terrorist-hostage reporting? Did things get reported just to "scoop" the competition? Were the visual elements of television getting the best of the concept the journalists claimed most to rely upon, newsworthiness? Should any journalist attempt to consider the consequences of reporting news in making decisions about what to report and what to withold? These and other issues were discussed, but usually little was resolved.

There was some discussion over how there could be any resolution and how its outcome, whatever that might be, could be communicated to journalists and perhaps enforced upon them. One psychologist, Dr. David Hubbard, noted that the news industry seemed "to lack internal professional organs through which to distribute knowledge of this subject if you had it."[49] There was something of an answer to Hubbard's observation in that guidelines, if they could be written, could be distributed internally by most news organizations and externally through publications such as Broadcasting magazine or the RTNDA Communicator. However, there was -- and is -- substantial controversy over whether formal written guidelines can or should be prepared.

The April issue of RTNDA Communicator summarized these conferences by noting that "by and large, the police want to restrict the media

and to establish guidelines for coverage of incidents where lives are at stake, while journalists want to have the freedom to report the story as fully as possible."[50] There's a slight error in the statement for there were really two kinds of guidelines discussed. One kind, the type referred to in the quotation above, would be the joint product of police and press and apply, probably with some force, to both. Washington DC police chief Maurice J. Cullinane proposed such a "mutual agreement" late in 1977 but found it roundly criticized by working journalists as a restriction on general press freedom and by broadcast journalists as an impermissible delegation of programming responsibility.[51] Cullinane's successor,Burtell M. Jefferson, modified his predecessor's proposal in early 1978, converting it into a call for the second kind of guideline that had been more frequently and positively discussed, a guideline drawn up by the press alone rather than by press and police cooperatively.[52]

The idea of such a media-controlled and originated guideline attracted some in the press but repelled others.[53] Sam Zelman, Executive Director of News for WJLA-TV (Washington, DC) argued vigorously against such guidelines, feeling that such self-censorship interrupted the free flow of information to the public and that guidelines were impossible to write anyway given the variability of hostage situations.[54] A Vice President of RTNDA took a similar position.[55] Other broadcast journalists saw promise in a written guideline approach, however, for by midyear two major national news suppliers, CBS News and UPI, had drafted written terrorism-hostage guidelines.

On April 14, 1977, Richard S. Salant, President of CBS News, issued "production guidelines to be followed by CBS News in its 'coverage of

terrorists.'" The two-page, single-spaced release began with four assumptions: (1) that there was a real possibility of "contagion" in covering these kinds of events, but, (2) that suppressing news could adversely affect CBS News' credibility, (3) encourage rumor, and (4) distort news judgments "for some extraneous judgmental purpose." Starting from these notions, CBS offered seven guidelines for exercising "particular care in how we treat the terrorist/kidnapper."[56] The seven guidelines, in slightly paraphrased and shortened form, are listed below:

1. Journalists should avoid providing excessive platforms for terrorists and, unless succinctly stated, paraphrase their demands.

2. Live coverage of terrorist/kidnappers should be permitted only in the most compelling circumstances, "and then only with the approval of the President of CBS News, or in his absence, the Senior Vice President of News."

3. Members of the news media should be mindful of the problems authorities have in contacting terrorists and should find out first whether media use of telephones will interfere with the authorities' communications.

4. Experts in hostage situations should be contacted by journalists for advice on phraseology and questions or reports to avoid but reporters should take that advice only as recommendations and not as instructions.

5. Local authorities should be given the name of news personnel to contact with any further guidance they may want to give news personnel about things that might interfere with authorities dealing with terrorists.

6. Inflamatory language and reporting rumors should be avoided. Reporters should obey police instructions, but report any instructions that seem intended to manage or suppress news to CBS superiors.

7. Coverage of terrorist acts should be of a balanced length so "that it does not unduly crowd out other important news of the hour/day."

The UPI guidelines, prepared by the United Press International Broadcast

Advisory Board and published in November, were obviously based in part on the CBS Guidelines but were more succinct. In fact, they were kept short enough to be distributed as a 8 ½ by 11 inch wall poster for newsroom use. They are quoted verbatim below.

1. Each station should have established procedures for coverage of such events, which should include prompt notification of management.

2. Judge each story on its own and if the story is newsworthy, cover it.

3. Coverage should be thoughtful, conscientious and show restraint, and be carried out with an awareness of the potential danger to life and person.

4. Report demands made as an essential point of the story but do not provide an excessive platform for those demands.

5. Reporters should avoid deliberately injecting themselves into the story as intermediaries or negotiators.

6. If there has been no mention of a deadline, no one should ask the terrorist-kidnappers if there IS one.

7. Above all, apply the rules of common sense.[57]

By the time of the RTNDA National Convention in San Francisco in September, 1977, written guidelines had become a very commonly-made suggestion for action on the terrorist-hostage issue, although there was considerable disagreement about what to put into the guidelines. The National News Council in March, 1977, volunteered to "become a repository for such guidelines or internal memoranda and to circulate them to all interested news organizations."[58] At the RTNDA conference, Salant plugged this News Council effort, but at the same time made it quite clear who he believed should be writing and enforcing guidelines or standards for Media behavior: "For God's sake, leave it in the hands of professional journalists."[59] Salant was certainly not the only participant on these

panels, or in their audiences, to describe journalists as professionals and then to suggest that a large portion of the "solution" of the terrorist-hostage problem could be found in giving journalists professional autonomy. There were others who argued that journalists, like doctors, lawyers and educators should be largely left alone to regulate their affairs for they knew best how to do it. To use the term to describe journalists, however, is a bit odd, particularly when done by journalists who usually pride themselves on precise use of language.[60] Its use is odd because there is reasonable doubt that journalists are, can be, or even wish to be highly professionalized as defined by sociologists or by the law.

The issue of the professionalism of journalists has been a long-standing subject of inquiry in law and sociology. Sociologists usually conclude that journalists are not highly professionalized. The law -- or labor law at least -- usually must make a dichotomous judgment; one is either a professional or one is not, and it has consistently been concluded that journalists are not professionals under the National Labor Relations Act.

Mass communications scholars have studied the professionalism of journalists since at least 1964. Their inquiry is sometimes confused by the issue of whether one should focus on the general occupation -- is journalism a profession? -- or upon the specific practioners -- are journalists professional? Even when researchers make a choice between these two approaches, or simultaneously examine both, there remains substantial disagreement about the defining criteria for either a profession or for professionalization. When inquiry into occupational

sociology began, there was a tendency to simply classify persons as professionals or non-professionals.[61] More contemporary sociological theory, however, looks on professionalism as a continuous variable and will more likely try to determine how professional a worker is compared either to co-workers in the same field or to workers in other fields usually thought of as professions.

Clearly the seminal piece of research on journalistic professionalism was a study reported by McLeod and Hawley in 1964.[62] Those authors settled on a list of eight criteria relevant to deciding if an occupation was a profession:

> 1) It must perform a unique and essential service, 2) it must emphasize intellectual techniques, 3) it must have a long period of specialized training to acquire a systematic body of knowledge based on research, 4) it must be given a broad range of autonomy, 5) its practitioners must accept broad personal responsibility for judgments and actions, 6) it must place greater emphasis on service than on private economic gain, 7) it must develop a comprehensive self-governing organization and 8) it must have a code of ethics which has been clarified and interpreted by concrete cases.[63]

Admitting that they were unsure that journalism really displayed all these characteristics, they none-the-less predicted that a "professional person should place heavy emphasis on service, intellectual activity, autonomy and influence."[64] These predictions were converted to hypotheses that more professionally oriented journalists: "1) would be more in favor of implementing professional values and 2) would be more critical of the newspaper for which they work."[65] The researchers were able to divide the editorial employees of the Milwaukee Journal and Sentinel into a professional group and a group they called "semi-pros," and the former group did have higher support for professional values while being more critical of their respective newspapers than was true for the

semi-pros. In simple terms, the authors found that some journalists at the newspapers they studied were more professionalized than others, and that all of the journalists were more professionalized than non-editorial employees at the same newspapers. Their study, however, did not permit them to say much about the absolute rather than relative strength of journalistic professionalism for there was no comparison of their journalists with workers from other fields. They none-the-less concluded that they had shown journalists to be somewhat professionalized.

Four major studies of broadcast journalists have reached about the same conclusions: that broadcast journalism exhibits only some of the traits of a profession and that some broadcast journalists are more professionalized than others. The details of these studies are found in footnote 66. In general, however, nearly all who have studied the professionalism of journalists -- both in broadcasting and in print -- have concluded that at best, journalists are semi-professionals or emerging professionals and that there are many ways in which journalism itself, largely through lack of a licensing system or heavy reliance on formal education is only approaching the status of a profession. Usually the journalist comes out as much less professional than more traditional professionals such as lawyers or physicians. It appears then that journalists have, at best, some difficulty supporting claims that they are entitled to self-regulatory autonomy on a sociological basis.

One may then inquire whether their position is supported by or recognized by the law. If anything, however, the law is more emphatic than sociology in its judgement that journalism is not a profession and its practitioners are not professionals. Such determinations are commonly made in the area of labor law. Under the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA), professionals are entitled to form unions and claim the protections of the act. However, section 9(b)(1) provides that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may not group "professional employees and employees that are not professional employees" into a single bargaining unit "unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."[67] Accordingly, the NLRB has, on occasion, decided whether working journalists are professionals entitled to a self-determination election. The question turns on the definition of "professional employee" in section (2)(1) of the act.[68] A professional employee is...

> (a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
>
> (b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause "iv" of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).

In two cases decided just the year following enactment of this section of the act, the NLRB ruled that working journalists did not fit within this definition of professional employee. What was particularly important in both cases was the requirement for study in a specialized discipline ordinarily taught in a university. In the first of these cases, the American Newspaper Guild attempted to organize all editorial employees of the Hoboken, NJ Jersey Observer.[69] The employer argued that

some of these employees were professionals under the NLRA. The Board found that "none of the employees in the editorial department," either those the editor thought professional or any others, "are required to have a license or to undergo specialized training in a school of higher learning."[70] Further, the Board could not discern any meaningful distinction between the editorial employees claimed to be professionals and those for whom the status was not asserted: "... we are of the opinion that the employees asserted by the Employer to be professional employees are not professional employees within the meaning of Section 2 (12) of the Act"[71] Just 29 days later, the NLRB reinforced this holding with another opinion. There the Newspaper Guild wanted to exclude certain editors, reporters and clerks from a bargaining unit and asserted that they were professional employees. The board rejected the argument, noting that "there is no evidence that any of these employees perform work that requires knowledge of an advanced type, in a field of learning customarily acquired by a course of specialized intellectual instruction in an institution of higher learning, as distinguished from a general academic education. They do not fall, therefore, within the meaning of a 'professional employee.'"[72]

In 1976, the NLRB was expressly invited, in the Express-News Corporation case, to reconsider these old holdings.[73] The case arose when the San Antonio Typographical Union attempted to form a bargaining unit composed of reporters, editors and photographers but also librarians, copy carriers and operators of computerized copy processing machines. The employer, the Express-News Corporation, challenged this as an impermissible combination of professional and non-professional employees requiring a self-determination election. The newspaper was

well aware of the 1948 precedents against its position, but argued that those cases "should be reversed and journalists accorded professional status in view of the dynamic changes which have occurred in the communications media in recent years."[74] To the paper, these changes included increased specialization of reporters, increased numbers of college-trained personnel and a preference for college graduates, better cooperation between the newspaper industry and communications schools, and "the unique responsibility of a free press in a democratic system."[75]

The NLRB declined the invitation to reconsider. To the NLRB it was particularly important that this newspaper did not require specialized knowledge or training of all the claimed professional employees: "the news department herein is not predominantly composed of individuals with advanced knowledge acquired through a prolonged course of specialized study in journalism or communications in an institution of higher learning."[76] This would suggest that a newspaper staffed predominantly with college journalism graduates might succeed in getting those employees classified as professionals. However, that seems unlikely in light of a second aspect of the NLRB ruling. The Board examined the work performed by the Express-News staff and concluded that the staff members who did not have college journalism backgrounds none-the-less functioned well: "the work of these journalists is not 'professional' within the meaning of the Act because it can be competently accomplished without requiring advanced degrees in journalism or equivalent experience."[77] Thus, as recently as two years ago, the NLRB stuck to established cases and ruled that newspaper journalists, at least, are not professionals under the National Labor Relations Act.[78]

Journalists, then, are clearly not professionals by law and are at best semi-professionals by sociological standards. The claim by Salant and others that "professional journalists" should be free to solve the terrorism-hostage coverage problems by self-regulation, then, is not supportable if it rests upon existing legal or sociological evidence of professionalism. Responses to terrorism-hostage situations based upon professionalism being without support, perhaps the best approach to the problem appears in advice given by Dr. David Hubbard at the San Francisco RTNDA session: gather more data, systematically, before committing to any particular course of action and do not generalize from the hit-and-miss evidence available from present documentary sources or convention transcripts.[79] There is a real need for a better data base on how prepared broadcast journalists are to cope with terrorist-hostage coverage, what values they bring to that task and how they might deal with common problems in terrorist-hostage coverage.

In December, 1977 the author mailed survey forms to a sample of television broadcast station news directors as part of an effort to gather some of the needed data. The survey focused on four areas thought to be central to the general controversy: (1) attitudes toward and experiences with self-regulatory codes, (2) attitudes toward statements derived from the existing CBS and UPI codes, and other statements directed at aspects of the controversy gathered from the literature and from convention sessions, (3) selected aspects of professionalism and professional autonomy and (4) probable behavior in hypothetical terrorism-hostage coverage situations.[80]

The sample was selected to include broadcast stations throughout the United States -- large markets as well as small ones, commercial and non-

commercial stations. Since terrorism is a potential problem everywhere, all broadcast journalists should be capable of coping with it. Casting such a wide net, however, means that most respondents to this survey -- like most broadcast journalists -- have had little actual experience in covering terrorist-hostage situations. Of 103 respondents who answered a question about prior terrorist-hostage experience, only 15 (14.6%) reported that they had covered such a situation. For most, then, this questionnaire posed new experiences of a somewhat hypothetical nature.

If, however, ENG equipment increases the possibility that a journalist will confront the problems associated with live coverage of terrorist-hostage incidents, then the results of this survey are pertinent to making decisions about what to do about terrorist-hostage coverage, for the survey confirms high penetration of ENG equipment. If only commercial TV stations are counted, 67.1% of them (57 of 85) reported having ENG cameras and portable video units. The microwave equipment needed to go to live "real time" transmission, however, is held by only 40.0% of commercial stations (34 of 85).[81]

The news directors working for these stations seem to be experienced broadcast journalists. Most (45 of 85, or 52.9%) have held their present position for from 1 to 3 years, but nearly all (68/85, 80.0%) have more than 6 years of broadcast journalism experience. For more than half of the news directors, it appears that all of their experience is in broadcast journalism with no prior print journalism experience (48/80, 60.0%). Despite all this experience, these news directors are relatively young with 54.1% (46/85) being between the ages of 31 and 40.

Over a quarter of the stations represented here (22/62, 26.2%) claim to have already adopted written codes for handling terrorist-hostage

situations. There is a clear and direct relationship between market size and adoption of codes: 66.7% of stations in the top ten markets and 50% of stations in markets 11 to 25 report adopting codes, as opposed to 34.6% of stations in markets 50 to 100 and just 10.7% of stations in markets 101 and below (Chi square = 9.42, 4 d.f., sig. = .0513). There may be some limited use of the existing codes of CBS and UPI as models, for five of the stations with codes reported use of a network code as a model and four used codes of "non-network news suppliers (e.g., AP, UPI)." However, there is no statistically significant relationship between availability of a model code and adoption of codes, and, as will be discussed shortly, having a model available (i.e., being a UPI subscriber or CBS affiliate) does not relate statistically to the news director's performance in hypothetical terrorism-hostage coverage situations nor to attitudes toward questions related to professionalism or aspects of the terrorism-hostage controversy. Four stations claimed to have developed codes on their own without use of any model, and the remaining stations borrowed from a wide variety of sources.

A substantial number of stations that have not yet adopted codes are considering them. Most commonly, a station that has not adopted a code will at least say that it "may do so" (19/57, 33.3%). Many stations also said they were considering a code when the survey arrived but had not yet actually started writing it down (16/57, 28.1%). One station (1/57, 1.8%) claimed to be writing a code when the survey was taken. About one quarter of stations, however, seem unlikely to adopt written codes: 22.8% (13/57) said they probably wouldn't consider writing a code while 14.0% (8/57) said they definitely had decided against writing one. Market size is related to attitude toward writing codes among stations that have not yet adopted them.

If responses to these questions are grouped and dichotomized into those favorably disposed to terrorism-hostage codes and those opposed to them, most of the opposition to such codes comes from smaller markets. (Chi square = 9.28, 4 d.f., sig. = .0544). Over half, 61.1% (11/18) of respondents who seemed opposed to adopting codes came from markets 101 and below.

All respondents were asked to assume that written codes were inevitable and then permitted to indicate a preference among certain types of codes. Four options were available: the most preferred was a code where compliance was discretionary and the language general or broad -- i.e., a very non-specific and non-binding guide. This was favored by 45.5% of respondents (36/80). A general but non-discretionary code had slightly less support (25/80, 31.3%). Apparently broadcast news directors are more concerned about the language of codes becoming too precise than they are about whether compliance with codes is mandatory or discretionary, for codes with specific language were not much favored. Only 16.2% (13/80) of respondents supported a discretionary code with specific language, and just 7.5% (6/80) supported a code that was both mandatory and specific -- the most precise possibility. Those who had adopted codes had greater support for precise and mandatory codes than those who had not adopted codes (Chi square = 9.43, 3 d.f., sig. = .0240): forced to choose, 51.7% of those who had not adopted codes would select the least stringent type of code (30/58). At a later point in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate their support for written journalistic codes -- not just terrorist-hostage codes but written codes in general. As will be reported later, respondents overall were more or less neutral toward the statement, but those who tended to support the statement also tended to support the more specific and mandatory types of terrorism-hostage coverage codes (Chi square = 24.13, 12 d.f., sig. = .0195).

There seems to be a willingness to get together with other broadcasters in a market to write codes (63/84, 75.0%), but apparently the news directors do not believe that those codes, once written, need necessarily be adopted on a market-wide basis, a proposal sometimes advanced to reduce the alleged ill effects of competition upon terrorist-hostage coverage. Only 23.5% of respondents (20/85) believed marketwide codes appropriate. Those broadcasters favorably disposed toward adopting terrorist-hostage codes were more willing to cooperate in writing marketwide codes than those who thought it unlikely that their station would adopt a terrorist-hostage code (Chi square = 7.27, 1 d.f., sig. = .0072). In other words, among those who had not yet adopted codes, those who were at most favorably disposed toward their adoption overwhelmingly (30/36, 83.3%) were willing to cooperate toward a marketwide code.

It is obvious that these local broadcast news executives believe that if codes are adopted at all they should be adopted at the local station level. Of 85 respondents to questions about who should adopt codes if any are adopted, 74.1% (63/85) thought local stations should. Professional broadcasting associations like the NAB and RTNDA had the next greatest support -- 35.3% (30/85). Networks followed, being favored by 28.2% (24/85). As already stated, there was less support for marketwide adoption (20/85, 23.5%), codes adopted by broadcast station groups (19/85, 22.4%) or -- strangely, given the high ranking of network codes -- codes adopted by non-network news suppliers such as the wire services (15/85, 17.6%). There was almost no support for the notion that the FCC might promulgate or adopt a terrorist-hostage code (3/85, 3.5%).

A further series of questions probed the possible content of codes by

seeking the news directors' opinions about statements derived from the existing CBS and UPI codes, the justifications advanced for those codes and other issues that had arisen in the panel discussions over how to respond to the terrorism-hostage coverage problem. The overall results of these questions are shown in Table 1. Each of these twelve statements was examined for its relationship to nine potential predictor or intervenor variables: availability of a model code, adoption of codes, attitude toward codes among those who had not adopted them, availability of ENG cameras and recording equipment, ability to interrupt entertainment programming to present news, RTNDA membership, amount of broadcast journalism experience, status of the station as an independent or network affiliate and market size.[82]

As can be seen, there was very modest support for most of the statements, as well as for the general notion of having written codes. There was a slight tendency to agree that competition could make terrorism-hostage coverage harder. This was most true of those news directors with access to ENG recorders and cameras (Chi square = 11.72, 5 d.f., sig. = .0388) and among those news directors with the greatest broadcast journalism experience (Chi square = 53.28, 15 d.f., sig. = .0000). There was, however, disagreement with the proposition that ENG equipment made it harder for broadcast journalists to cover the news responsibly. Those with the authority to interrupt entertainment programming were more likely to agree that ENG equipment made it more difficult to broadcast responsibly than those without such equipment (Chi square = 10.10, 4 d.f., sig. = .0387).

Two statements related to existing codes drew disagreement. Respondents tended to disagree slightly with the notion that failure to report all could reduce the credibility of the broadcast media, one of the premises upon which the CBS Guidelines had been issued. All of the direct CBS Guideline statements

found support. Those who were inclined to support terrorist-hostage codes, but had not yet adopted them, were more likely than those opposed to such codes to agree that it was best to have reporters report terrorist demands rather than to let the terrorists on the air themselves (Chi square = 9.77, 4 d.f., sig. = .0445). The least experienced of the broadcast journalists -- those with three or less years experience -- were more likely than others to agree that experts in terrorist/hostage negotiation should be consulted for guidance in how to cover a situation without exacerbating it (Chi square = 27.03, 12 d.f., sig. = .0076). It is interesting to note that there was less support for the propositions upon which the CBS guidelines were erected than for the guidelines themselves; apparently not all working news directors make the same assumptions about the effects of terrorist-hostage coverage or the self-censorship of news as do the executives of CBS News.[83]

One UPI guideline statement -- that reporters should never become intermediaries between terrorists and police -- drew modest disagreement.[84] There was substantial agreement with the UPI notion that terrorist stories had to be covered if they were newsworthy, with an interesting tendency for news directors of network affiliated stations to support this statement more strongly than news directors at independent stations (Chi square = 14.15, 2 d.f., sig. = .0008). There was also general support for the UPI guideline that " 'Common Sense' is a workable guide for covering terrorists." Here those with the ability to interrupt entertainment programming supported the statement more strongly than those without that ability (Chi square = 8.81, 3 d.f., sig. = .0319) as did those with ENG equipment compared to those without it (Chi square = 10.29, 3 d.f., sig. = .0162). The statement also found more support from news directors with more than three years of

broadcast journalism experience than among their less experienced colleagues (Chi square = 31.15, 9 d.f., sig. = .0003).

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Generally, most news directors have the authority -- autonomy -- to interrupt their station's entertainment programming to present live news coverage. Of 85 stations responding, the news director has that authority in 55.3% of the cases (47/85). For 18 stations, the authority reaches still lower to news producers or to anchorpersons (18/85, 21.1%). However, in about one-fourth of all stations responding (20/85, 23.5%), news directors do not have the authority to interrupt programming -- that function is reserved for the general manager. News directors at stations with live microwave capability are more likely than directors at stations without that equipment to have the authority to interrupt programming (Chi square = 5.52, 1 d.f., sig. = .0188). Interestingly, there is a relationship between broadcast journalism experience and ability to interrupt programming (Chi square = 20.98, 3 d.f., sig. = .0001). None of the news directors with three years or less of broadcast journalism experience was given the ability to interrupt by their management. There is a slight tendency, although it does not quite reach statistical significance, for more RTNDA members (45/54, 83.3%) than non-members (20/31, 64.5%) to have authority to interrupt entertainment programming (Chi square = 2.90, 1 d.f., sig. = .0886).

In the sense that most news directors seem to have the authority to interrupt programming, there may be something of a weak indication of an effect of professional values. Those without that autonomy, who must instead depend on general managers who are usually not journalists, may be slightly

TABLE 1: NEWS DIRECTOR OPINIONS OF STATEMENTS DRAWN FROM EXISTING CODES OR RELATED TO THE TERRORISM-HOSTAGE DILEMMA.

	Mean Scores*
A. Statements based on the assumptions behind the CBS Guidelines.	
Live coverage of terrorist-hostage situations incites more such incidents.	2.905
Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist-hostage situation is likely to encourage the spread of rumors.	2.762
Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist-hostage situation is likely to reduce the credibility of the broadcast media.	3.060
B. Statements based directly on some of the seven CBS Guidelines.	
It is better to have reporters report terrorist demands than to let the terrorists on the air themselves.	2.183
Journalists must remember that activities like calling terrorists on the phone may disrupt proper police activities.	2.096
Experts in terrorist-hostage negotiations should be consulted for guidance in how to cover a situation without exacerbating it.	2.048
Journalists should give police the names of "key" reporters to contact if police want to offer guidance on coverage.	2.452
C. Statements based directly on some UPI guidelines.	
If terrorist stories are newsworthy, they must be covered.	1.494
Reporters should never be intermediaries between terrorists and police.	3.167
"Common Sense" is a workable guide for covering terrorists.	1.793
D. Miscellaneous Statements.	
Live "ENG" equipment has made it harder for broadcast journalists to cover the news responsibly.	3.321
Competition from other media can make it harder to cover terrorist-hostage situations responsibly.	2.512

*Mean on a range of 1-5: 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=No Opinion, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree.

less professionalized than those with the ability to interrupt. Other evidence of some professionalism among these news directors can be found in their membership in professional organizations and associations. Over three-fourths of the commercial stations with responding news directors are members of the National Association of Broadcasters (67/85, 78.8%) -- a figure comparable to the NAB's national membership percentage -- and most follow the NAB Code (62/85, 72.9%). A large proportion of the responding news directors (54/85, 63.5%) are individual members of RTNDA. They tend not, however, to be members of Sigma Delta Chi, an honorary journalistic organization (29/85, 34.1%) or of local journalistic organizations (22/85, 25.9%). The RTNDA figure is slightly higher than that found by other researchers, but the lack of local ties is consistent with previous research.[85]

Nine statements were included in the questionnaire to tap news director attitudes toward statements thought by previous researchers to be aspects of broadcast journalism professionalism.[86] The overall results of these questions are shown in Table 2. Each of the nine statements was, as was the case with the statements about terrorism-hostage coverage issues, examined for its relationship to nine potential predictor or intervenor variables: availability of a model code, adoption of codes, attitude toward codes among those who had not adopted them, availability of ENG cameras and recording equipment, ability to interrupt entertainment programming to present news, RTNDA membership, amount of broadcast journalism experience, status of the station as an independent or network affiliate and market size.[87] As in earlier studies, it was found that these respondents can be best described as modestly professionalized, with some holding more tightly to alleged professional values than others, but with substantially less than wholehearted

endorsement for some aspects of professionalism usually identified by occupational sociologists.

Respondent news directors tended to disagree, or at least be neutral toward, two of six statements where agreement would indicate professionalism. This disagreement was greatest with the statement that there should be some "respected organization of journalists" to certify their competency. The respondents also disagreed, very slightly, with the idea that they should be required to take periodic college refresher courses. News directors in the smallest TV markets (100 and below) tended to agree with the statement, but those from the largest (top 10) markets disagreed most, although the relationship between market size and reaction to this statement only approached statistical significance (Chi square = 25.75, 16 d.f., sig. = .0577). Among those who had not adopted terrorism-hostage codes, there was more disagreement with the idea of refresher courses from those who seemed unlikely to eventually adopt codes than there was among those more favorably disposed to codes, but this relationship, too, only approached statistical significance (Chi square = 9.15, 4 d.f., sig. = .0574).

Greatest overall agreement came with the statement that a newsman's role included responsibility to the public. Second in overall support was the idea that a station's goal should be "daily, comprehensive and complete news coverage." Although this statement found support among both independent and network affiliated news directors, support for it was much stronger among the affiliated directors than it was among independent station directors (Chi square = 17.55, 4 d.f., sig. = .0015). Support for it was also slightly less among news directors with three years or less of broadcast journalism experience than it was among the more experienced

respondents (Chi square = 20.90, 12 d.f., sig. = .0518). There was a tendency for it to find lower than normal support in the top 10 markets, but the relationship between market size and this statement only approached statistical significance (Chi square = 23.74, 16 d.f., sig. = .0953).

Respondents generally supported the idea that they should play a role in setting news policies. There was a tendency for this idea to have more support among news directors for network affiliated stations than among directors from independent stations (Chi square = 7.73, 4 d.f., sig. = .1020) and from those with authority to interrupt entertainment programming than from those who lacked that authority (Chi square = 8.87, 4 d.f., sig. = .0681), but both relationships only approached statistical significance. Respondents supported slightly -- or were really almost neutral toward -- the idea that it was generally important for broadcasters to have written codes to follow. There was a clear relationship here between adopting a terrorist-hostage code and supporting codes generally (Chi square = 12.80, 4 d.f., sig. = .0123): those who had adopted terrorist-hostage codes supported codes in general (mean = 2.05), those who had not adopted terrorist-hostage codes were neutral (mean = 3.06).

The respondents tended to agree, or at least be neutral toward, one of three statements where disagreement would indicate professionalism. Overall, respondents were more or less neutral toward the notion that journalists should work for stations despite lack of support for their station's editorial policy. They disagreed, as expected, with the statement that newsmen could alter their beliefs or principles to get along with supervisors or management and with the idea that newsmen could allow time pressures to affect the accuracy of stories. Disagreement on this last point tended to be greater among those with ENG equipment than among those

without it (Chi square = 7.92, 4 d.f., sig. = .0944) and among those who, while not yet adopting codes were favorably disposed to them, than among terrorist-hostage code opponents (Chi square = 8.63, 4 d.f., sig. = .0710), but both of these relationships only approached statistical significance.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Finally, respondents were given the opportunity to indicate how they would respond in six hypothetical terrorist-hostage coverage situations. In each instance, they were presented with the hypothetical situation and then forced to select from among closed response alternatives. Offensive language -- as in the Kiritsis case -- was not for most a reason to halt coverage altogether. The most common response was to stop transmission of the audio signal only (36/84, 42.9%), a response more common among those with three years or less broadcast journalism experience than among the more experienced journalists (Chi square = 27.18, 12, d.f., sig. = .0073). Those who would halt the audio had greater agreement with the idea that terrorist demands should be reported by journalists rather than made on the air by the terrorists themselves than those who would make some other response to offensive language (Chi square = 27.07, 16 d.f., sig. = .0407). Many news director respondents (35/84, 29.8%) would, however, do nothing and simply let the language go out over the airwaves. Directors who agreed most with the statement that terrorist events had to be covered if they were newsworthy were more likely than others to simply let coverage go on (Chi square = 13.93, 8 d.f., sig. = .0836), although this relationship only approached statistical significance. A small number of news directors would let the language continue, but have the reporter or anchor interrupt and

TABLE 2: NEWS DIRECTOR OPINIONS OF STATEMENTS RELATED TO PROFESSIONALISM.

	Mean Score*
A. Statements where agreement would be thought to indicate professionalism.	
A part of a newsman's role is to be responsible to the public.	1.310
It's important for broadcasters to have written codes to follow.	2.829
The working newsmen of a broadcast station have a legitimate right to help determine content and news policies.	2.108
The working newsman should be required, periodically, to take refresher courses at nearby colleges or universities.	3.096
One of the broadcast station's goals should be daily comprehensive and complete news coverage.	1.536
There should be a respected organization of journalists that certifies other new journalists to insure qualifications, training and competence of those who practice journalism.	3.566
B. Statements where disagreement would be thought to indicate professionalism.	
A newsman may allow the pressures of time to affect the accuracy of his story.	3.786
The need for a workable relationship with supervisors or management means newsmen may have to alter their beliefs or principles.	3.671
A journalist should continue to work for a station even if he disagrees with its editorial policy.	2.711

*Mean on a range of 1-5: 1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=No Opinion, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly Disagree.

occasionally offer apologies for it (14/84, 16.7%). Only 8.3% (7/84) would stop coverage completely.[88]

More respondents were likely to stop coverage completely if there was a "good chance that somebody may be physically hurt or murdered on camera" (30/83, 36.1%) but the most common response here was still to let live coverage continue (43/83, 51.8%). Those without authority to interrupt entertainment programming were more likely than those with such authority to let coverage continue without some action by the news director (Chi square = 8.02, 3 d.f., sig. = .0455). A small number of news directors would switch frequently between the field crew and studio and simply hope that if anything happened it would be while the studio rather than the field cameras were on (9/83, 10.8%). This group tended to include those opposed in general to written broadcast journalism codes, while those who supported codes took other kinds of action or shut off coverage completely (Chi square = 18.8, 12 d.f., sig. = .0935), although this relationship was not quite statistically significant.

Four of the hypotheticals dealt with police-media interaction, an important part of the terrorism-hostage controversy. Respondents were asked what they would do if police asked that information be withheld claiming that the information would harm lives if released. All respondents indicated they would provide some cooperation, but in varying degrees. Slightly over half (43/83, 51.8%) would be selective about what they would withhold, taking the police request into account but still broadcasting what they "felt the public had a right to know." Those who would be selective support the statement that terrorist events have to be covered if newsworthy more than those who would just comply totally with the police request (Chi square = 6.42, 2 d.f., sig. = .0404). A fair number of respondents (40/83, 48.2%) would comply

totally with the request. These people are more likely than those who would be selective in their response to the police request to support the statement that "common sense" provides a workable guide for terrorist coverage (Chi square = 7.80, 3 d.f., sig. = .0461).

The responding news directors were most unlikely to comply with a police request to "broadcast information you know is false, saying that it would help save lives." Here the most frequent response was just to not broadcast anything at all, neither the information nor the fact of a police request. Those who would broadcast nothing tend to disagree more than those who would do other things with the statement that ENG equipment has made it harder for broadcasters to cover the news responsibly. Those who would simply broadcast the requested information without any comment, in fact, agreed with the idea that ENG coverage made responsible broadcast journalism more difficult (Chi square = 27.48, 16 d.f., sig. = .0365). News directors with ENG equipment were most likely to broadcast nothing while those without the equipment most commonly said they would broadcast the information but say it was being broadcast at police request (Chi square = 14.38, 4 d.f., sig. = .0062). As mentioned, a few news directors (8/80, 10%) would comply without question with this kind of police request, but 3.7% (3/80) would partially divulge the police plan by reporting that police had requested that false information be broadcast. They would not broadcast the information itself. Those who would just broadcast the requested information tended to disagree more than those who would take another course of action with the statement that a broadcast journalist could allow time pressures to affect story accuracy (Chi square = 33.66, 16 d.f., sig. = .0060).

Most respondents were willing to broadcast terrorist press conferences

on a police request that it be done to save lives. Nearly all, however, wanted it understood by the terrorist that coverage might be cut off (38/79, 48.1%). About a quarter of respondents (19/79, 24.1%) would cover the conference in full without such a condition. Those who would not do this agree more than those who would with the statement that it's better to have reporters report terrorist demands than to let the terrorists on the air themselves (Chi square = 32.92, 12 d.f., sig. = .0010). Another quarter of the respondents (19/79, 24.1%) would broadcast the press conference only if it did not have to be done live. A small number (3/79, 3.8%) would simply refuse to broadcast the press conference under any condition. These people would disagree more than all others with the idea that comprehensive coverage of news is a broadcast station's objective (Chi square = 34.47, 9 d.f., sig. = .0001) and also have less support than all others for the idea that terrorist stories must be covered if newsworthy (Chi square = 39.27, 6 d.f., sig. = .0000).

Finally, few would comply with a police request to limit contacts to a single official police source, even if it were claimed that that would save lives. Only 25.9% (21/81) would accept that kind of request. These respondents agree less than others with the statement that terrorist stories must be covered if newsworthy (Chi square = 4.66, 2 d.f., sig. = .0970) and would tend, more than others, to be willing to designate key reporters for police to contact with guidance about coverage (Chi square = 7.31, 3 d.f., sig. = .0626), but both of these relationships only approach statistical significance. Most respondents would ignore a police request to limit themselves to only one official source and would use any additional sources they thought appropriate (60/81, 74.1%). These people are more likely than those who would go along with the police request to agree that a newsman's

role includes responsibility to the public (Chi square = 7.62, 3 d.f., sig. = .0546). To a very slight extent, they are more supportive of written codes than those who would limit themselves to the single police source (Chi square = 12.30, 4 d.f., sig. = .0153).

The data from the survey generally support an interpretation that many broadcasters are concerned about terrorist-hostage coverage and would support some of the ideas advanced -- including written codes -- to deal with those types of coverage problems. There remains substantial disagreement within the journalism community over who should adopt such codes, how rigorous or specific they should be, and exactly what they should encourage or discourage. Like other aspects of this paper, this survey suggests at best quasi-professionalism for journalists, for "professionalism requires a sharing of values"[89] while the survey shows journalists, on these issues, to be quite heterogeneous in outlook. It is possible that this heterogeneity of outlook is not an indication of low professionalism but is simply natural in a problem area -- like live TV coverage of hostage situations -- of recent origin. Perhaps a more professional homogeneity will arise in the future. Given the consistent findings of occupational sociologists over the years, however, there is little realistic reason for expecting that to occur. One major reason, located before but clearly present in this survey as well, is that working journalists place a high value on individual autonomy, including autonomy from those very "professional" organizations that create consensus. Here there is much more support for local terrorism-hostage coverage codes than for codes adopted by national organizations and, of course, disagreement with the idea of certification of journalists by professional organizations. In the absence of homogeneity of values, and even in the face of opposition

to giving power to strong national professional organizations, there may still be grounds other than the claim of professionalism for generally leaving broadcast journalists alone to solve the problems of terrorist-hostage coverage.

Most likely, the government should leave journalists to self regulation in this area not because they are, might be or even want to be professionals as defined by sociologists or the law, but, instead, because of the function journalists perform in advancing the objectives of the First Amendment. While it has been established that the amendment provides more nearly absolute protection for news dissemination than for news gathering,[90] and clearly leaves open ways for government to restrict access to information about hostage situations,[91] direct governmental limits on the content of broadcast stories about terrorist-hostage situations would seem to run into substantial First Amendment opposition. Certainly direct prior restraint or severely "chilling" proposals like that of Pennsylvania Congressman Joshua Eilberg, to make broadcast of a live threat to injury of another person a crime, would have a rocky time if subjected to traditional First Amendment scrutiny.[92] Perhaps, however, there are more affirmative and content neutral steps that government could take to improve coverage of terrorist-hostage incidents.

First, there may be potential gain in amending sec. 2 (12) of the National Labor Relations Act to permit a more elastic and multi-dimensional definition of "professional employee" -- including a definition where not all characteristics would have to be fulfilled before a worker would be classified as a professional. The law might adopt some of the relative and comparative measures of professionalism used by social scientists, making journalists legally classifiable as professionals. The benefits of this

change relate to the effects of competition upon terrorist-hostage coverage. In convention and panel discussions on the problem, and to a more limited extent among the more experienced respondents and those with ENG equipment in this survey, there is evidence that a "scoop" mentality may make it harder to remain journalistically responsible in a terrorist-hostage coverage situation; the "suspension of competition" was often suggested at conventions as a remedy, but it was never explained how this might be justified to management and/or ownership. Under our system of broadcast regulation, where responsibility for operating the station legally rests in a non-delegable fashion with licensees,[93] it would be impossible for broadcast journalists to achieve complete autonomy from often non-journalist trained managers or owners. However, if classed as separate professional bargaining units, news directors and others might choose to, and be able to, bargain effectively with management for a greater role in deciding how to cover terrorism-hostage situations. There might be more sharing of responsibility; the number of qualified and experienced news directors who lack authority to interrupt entertainment programming for news might be reduced if journalists chose to bargain for that authority. Such an amendment to the NLRA would have disadvantages -- present broadcast unions usually want their bargaining units to be as large and all-inclusive as possible -- but it is an alternative to government content control that might be profitably explored.

There are also alternatives that the Federal Communications Commission might study. One was posed recently by the Commission when, as a result of a remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,[94] the FCC reopened its 1971-1974 Fairness Doctrine Inquiry to consider further an "Access is Fairness" proposal originally advanced by the San Francisco Bay Area based Committee for Open Media (COM). That proposal would have allowed broadcasters to opt for a

limited public access to the airwaves system in lieu of complying with the Commission's traditional standards for the Fairness Doctrine.[95] Under the proposal as originally advanced, a broadcaster would be deemed in "presumptive compliance" with the Fairness Doctrine if four conditions were met:

1) the licensee would set aside one hour per week for spot announcements and longer programming made available for presentation of messages by members of the public,
2) half of this time would be allocated on a simple first-come, first-served basis on any topic, the other half would be appropriated on a "representative spokesperson basis" -- with journalists qualifying as representative spokespersons in some instances,
3) under both types of access, the licensee would have no control over content and
4) the broadcaster would still be required to insure that some responses were broadcast to "editorial advertisements.[96]

On the basis of the Court remand, the Commission has opened an inquiry into the COM proposal and alternatives.[97] Its pertinence to the terrorism-hostage problem is that there is evidence that at least some terrorist-hostage situations arise because of individual frustration with inability to get personally important opinions before a wide audience. While it is doubtful that the very limited access alternative posed by the Committee for Open Media would satisfy the highly politically motivated terrorists such as the Hanafi muslims -- Khaalis reportedly turned down an interview request from a 20,000 watt station in Texas with the line "I don't talk to a radio station with less than 50,000 watts"[98] -- it might be possible that an individual like Kiritsis would be satisfied, or at least diverted from hostage taking, with the access available under a COM like proposal. The prospect is, at least, one that could be examined within the context of the inquiry recently opened, and is a proposition upon which psychologists of terrorism should already have useful data.

Of a more controversial nature, the FCC could amend its broadcast station license renewal forms to require broadcasters to outline what plans they have developed for handling terrorist-hostage situations. The Commission already asks for similar information about news policy generally and about children's programming plans. Usually the Commission makes no judgements whatsoever about the quality of a broadcaster's plans in these areas,[99] but even if it did it could probably accept any plan drawn up reasonably and in good faith and could accept a variety of plans tailored to different stations. The advantage to the requirement would be that it might stimulate the many broadcasters, particularly those in small markets, shown in the survey to be contemplating putting something down on paper to actually set their plans down in concrete form. It is obvious that broadcasters with written codes support them. Any such proposal would be controversial, but is not without precedent as a way of insuring that broadcasters at least make minimal plans for important aspects of their operation.

Finally, there are a variety of steps that governmental agencies other than the FCC might take to improve police-media relations without directly regulating content. As shown by former Washington, DC Police Chief Cullinane's proposals mentioned earlier, it is obvious that police-media relations in the District of Columbia were severely strained following the Hanafi Muslim siege. The District's new police chief, however, seems to be moving in directions more to the liking of the press. He has proposed that police make available to media representatives seminar training in how police handle terrorist situations.[100] The proposal seems to be meeting with press support. An impression gleaned from attending several of the journalist association panel discussions of terrorism-hostage coverage is that the press does not believe it knows all the answers to the questions associated with this kind of coverage.

The survey results here indicate that many working broadcast journalists consider the problems to be important and that there is some willingness to cooperate with police in reducing the chance of harm to human life. An affirmative government plan to provide information and terrorist-hostage training for both journalists and police forces might improve the performance of both semi-professional groups. Certainly that course of action is preferable to continued reliance on unsupportable concepts of the professionalism of journalists and to direct governmental content regulation of what is printed or broadcast about terrorist-hostage incidents.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is hard to formulate an operational or even conceptual definition of "terrorism-hostage taking incidents." The primary concern here is with terrorists who become hostage takers, for it was the taking of hostages that made many of these incidents too newsworthy for media personnel to ignore. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in 1976-1977, attempted to distinguish among terrorism, quasi-terrorism, civil disorder, political terrorism, nonpolitical terrorism, and official or state terrorism. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, DISORDERS AND TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM (1976). Police psychologists and psychiatrists who work with police make distinctions among types of hostage-takers: the insane, those who end up with hostages unintentially and those who take hostages deliberately and with great planning. Speech of Dr. Herbert Modlin, Professor of Community and Forensic Psychiatry, Menninger Foundation, Topeka, KA to Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual Meeting, St. Louis, MO, June 3, 1977. Author's notes.

2. See COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 362-388 (1968).

3. Gallup Poll: News of Terrorism Gets Good, Bad Views, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 37 (April 28, 1977). These views generally held true across common demographic subgroups. Nonwhites, however, had somewhat different opinions. Only 45% of nonwhites believed terrorism coverage incited terrorism; 67% of nonwhites believed terrorist coverage was getting about the right attention.

4. Carter Takes Noninterventionist Stance in Debate over Coverage of Terrorists, 92 BROADCASTING 28 (March 21, 1977).

5. Id.

6. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

7. COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATIONS, NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES AND BOOKS (1941).

8. Reprinted in KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 63 (3rd. ed. 1978).

9. Reprinted in KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 493 (2d ed., 1973).

10. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 432 (3d ed. 1976). District Judge Warren Ferguson of the U.S. District Court, Central District of California reached a similar conclusion about the motive for the NAB's adoption of the "Family Viewing" provision of the NAB Code. Concluding that the FCC had threatened the NAB into adopting this provision against its will, and also concluding that a self-regulatory system enforced by the NAB undercut the legal responsibility of individual broadcasters for their choice of programming, Judge Ferguson found that the Communications Act of 1934, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment had all been violated. The case is presently on appeal in the 9th Circuit. Writers Guild of America v. FCC, 38 P & F Radio Reg. 2d. 1409 (C.B.C.A., 1976). But see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 40 P & F Radio Reg. 2d. 1577 (C.A.D.C., 1977).

11. See Hickey, Terrorism and Television, 24 TV GUIDE 2 (July 31, 1976) and Hickey, The Medium in the Middle, 24 TV Guide 10 (August 7, 1976).

12. ARLEN, THE LIVING-ROOM WAR (1969).

13. How TV Stations Rise to the Occasion When Big News Breaks, 87 BROADCASTING 42 (August 19, 1974).

14. Saltzman, It's Live -- And It's Terrifying, 23 TV GUIDE 6 (March 15, 1975).

15. Portable Cameras, VTR's Move TV Journalism into New Age of Immediacy, 87 BROADCASTING 46 (August 19, 1974).

16. Special Report: Big Changes in Local News: More Speed, More Depth, More Demands, 87 BROADCASTING 41 (August 19, 1974).

17. Stone & DiCioccio, Survey Compares Coverage by ENG and Newsfilm, 32 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 12 (January, 1978).

18. BM/E's Panels of 100 Survey Reveals the Industry's Areas of Greatest Interest in 1978, 14 BM/E 93, 94 (February, 1978).

19. The account that follows is drawn mainly from the following newspaper accounts. City Executive Held Hostage, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 8, 1977); Police Await Next Demand, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 9, 1977); "I've Been an Angry Man for 44 Years," INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 2 (February 9, 1977); Hostage Case Near Turning Point, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 10, 1977); Radio Newsman Called to Command Trailer, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 10, 1977); Former Roommate "Keeping Tony Cool," INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 10, 1977); Kiritsis Faces Legal Battle after Freeing His Hostage, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 11, 1977); Never Intended to Honor Terms, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 1 (February 12, 1977); Gunman Refuses to Surrender; INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 1 (February 9, 1977); Hostage, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 10 (February 10, 1977); Hall Set Free After 63 Hours, Cursing Gunman Under Arrest, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 1 (February 11, 1977); Mood, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 23 (February 11, 1977); "We Interrupt This Program" . . .!?!?!, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 27 (February 11, 1977) and Indiana Executive Held 3 Days, 37 FACTS ON FILE 162 (March 5, 1977). Specific stories will be cited only upon direct quotation.

20. Speech of Bob Gamble, News Director WRTV, at Annual Convention of Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. Quotation from audio tape of the meeting.

21. For comment on this feeling, see Yount, An Open Letter to RTNDA on the Kiritsis Kidnap Coverage, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 13 (April, 1977).

22. Gunman, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 23 (February 11, 1977).

23. Mood, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 23 (February 11, 1977).

24. Long Ordeal Finally Ends with Harmless Gun Blast, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, p. 2 (February 11, 1977).

25. All of the time computations reported about the national Kiritsis coverage are made from TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS, pp. 252, 254, 257, 262, 263, 270, 271, 273, 276, 278, 282, 286, 288, 292, and 308, (February, 1977). The index is a publication of the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

26. Speech of Fred Heckman, News Director WIBC, at Annual Convention of Radio-Television News Directors Association, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. Quotation from audio tape of meeting.

27. "We Interrupt This Program" . . . . !?!?!, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, p. 27 (February 11, 1977).

28. Id.

29. Id. It is interesting to note that the event took place during a major television ratings period. Unfortunately, ratings statistics are reported in such a way that it is not exactly clear what happened to WRTV's audience when it pulled away from the coverage. It appears, however, that their decision had practically no effect in either shifting viewers to other stations or causing them to "tune-out" to TV altogether. Ratings for the other stations during the Kiritsis news conference remained about what they were for the entertainment programming that had been interrupted.

30. Id.

31. Vriesman, The Last Word . . ., 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 16 (March, 1977).

32. WHUR Newsman Dies in Terrorist Siege of Washington, 92 BROADCASTING 22, 22-23 (March 14, 1977).

33. All of the time computations reported about the national Hanafi coverage are made from TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS, pp. 460, 463, 466, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 476, 479, 482, 484, 485, 490, 505, 530, 532, 619,621,625 (March, 1977). The Index is a publication of the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

34. WHUR Newsman Dies in Terrorist Siege of Washington, 92 BROADCASTING 22, 23 (March 14, 1977).

35. Id.

36. Speech of Bill Ellingsworth, Director of Public Affairs, International Association of Chiefs of Police, at Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual Meeting, St. Louis, June 3, 1977. Author's Notes.

37. "Who's Who" Looks into the Ethical Questions of Covering Terrorist Acts, 92 BROADCASTING 28 (March 21, 1977).

38. Fenyvesi, Looking into the Muzzle of Terrorists, 65 QUILL 16 (July-August, 1977).

39. Monday, What's Wrong with Our Aim, 65 QUILL 19 (July-August, 1977).

40. Czerniejewski, Guidelines for the Coverage of Terrorism, 65 QUILL 21 (July-August, 1977).

41. Two Sides of the Coin on Media and Terrorists, 92 BROADCASTING 78 (April 4, 1977) and Debate on Coverage of Terrorism Comes Up with Few Solutions, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 12 (April, 1977).

42. AP Meeting Told Powers Will Shift in Broadcasting over Next 10 Years, 92 BROADCASTING 54 (June 13, 1977). Attended by author.

43. More How To than Hoopla at RTNDA, 93 BROADCASTING 48 (September 16, 1977). Audio tape of panel made available to author.

44. Speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Aberrant Behavior Center, Dallas at RTNDA Annual Convention, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. From audio tape of the session.

45. This position is typified by DC Police Chief Maurice Cullinane, see D.C. Police Seek to Limit Coverage of Terrorist Incidents, 93 BROADCASTING 52 (December 5, 1977).

46. It is somewhat unclear when the LEAA report was released. It bears a 1976 publication date, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, DISORDERS AND TERRORISM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DISORDERS AND TERRORISM (1976). An April, 1977 issue of LEAA NEWSLETTER says that the report was "published a week before the Washington, D.C. siege by Hanafi Muslims," which would be 1977. Task Force Urges Restraint, Negotiation with Terrorists, 6 LEAA NEWSLETTER 1, 10 (April, 1977).

47. Speech by Bill Ellingsworth, Director of Public Affairs, International Association of Chiefs of Police, at Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual Meeting, St. Louis, June 3, 1977. Author's notes.

48. Speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Aberrant Behavior Center, Dallas, at RTNDA Annual Convention, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. From audio tape of the session.

49. Id.

50. Debate on Coverage of Terrorism Comes Up with Few Solutions, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 12 (April, 1977).

51. D.C. Police Seek to Limit Coverage of Terrorist Incidents, 93 BROADCASTING 52 (December 5, 1977.

52. D.C. Police Back Off, 94 BROADCASTING 56 (January 23, 1978).

53. One of the strongest pleas for written codes came from media critic Ed Diamond of WTOP. Diamond proposed that hostage takers never be given air time to state a position or declare a grievance, that no pictures of terrorism in progress be used and that there be no personal publicity at all until the police close the case. Diamond, Media Critic Seeks Code on Handling Hostage Situations, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 13 (April, 1977).

54. Speech of Sam Zelman, WJLA-TV, at Associated Press Broadcasters, 7th Annual Meeting, St. Louis, June 3, 1977. Author's notes.

55. Schultz, Censorship is No Solution to Coverage of Terrorist-Hostage Situations, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 6 (July, 1977).

56. News Release, CBS NEWS ISSUES GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE OF TERRORISTS, (April 14, 1977). The complete guidelines are attached as Appendix A.

57. These guidelines were sent out in the updated wall poster form, but announced as forthcoming in Terrorism/Kidnapping Coverage Guidelines, 3 NAB HIGHLIGHTS 3 (November 7, 1977). Earlier UPI released slightly different guidelines intended primarily for print journalists. UPI Guidelines for Coverage of Terrorism, 3 NAB HIGHLIGHTS 3 (June 1, 1977). See also UPI Adopts Guidelines for Coverage of Terrorism, 31 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 4 (July, 1977). The print guidelines contain much more absolute prohibitions than the broadcast guidelines about journalists not becoming a part of the story or taking part in negotiations.

58. National News Council, Statement on Terrorism and the Media, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW 81 (May-June, 1977).

59. Speech of Richard Salant, President, CBS News at RTNDA Annual Convention, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. Quote from audio tape of the session. To be fair to Salant, it should be noted that this quotation was also addressed to the issue of who should be reporting on terrorist activities. Salant did not want such reporting done by "amateurs who are entertainers." He had also earlier in his speech used a phrase "We're in the news business, or profession, or craft" indicating that Salant may not be thoroughly convinced that journalism in a profession.

60. See NEWMAN, STRICTLY SPEAKING (1974).

61. See Kimball, Journalism: Art, Craft or Profession? in LYNN, THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 242 (1965). Several useful general introductions to occupational professionalization from a sociological perspective are LYNN, Id.; PAVELKO,

SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNICATIONS (1972) and VOLLMER & MILLS, PROFESSIONALIZATION (1966). Of somewhat less use, but still of interest are: ABRAHAMSON, THE PROFESSIONAL IN THE ORGANIZATION (1967); ETZIONI, THE SEMI-PROFESSIONS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION (1969); FREIDSON, THE PROFESSIONS AND THEIR PROSPECTS (1971); JACKSON, PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONALIZATION (1970); MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES (1970), PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS (1971) and TUNSTALL, MEDIA SOCIOLOGY (1970).

62. McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 529 (1964).

63. Id. at 530

64. Id.

65. Id.

66. LeRoy takes professionalism as a continuous variable and focuses on five clusters or categories of attitudes and beliefs: (1) the use of organizations as major reference groups; (2) a belief in service to the public; (3) a belief in self-regulation; (4) a sense of calling to the field and (5) autonomy in one's work. In other words, there must be both a professional structure and internalized professional values. Like others, LeRoy is trying mainly to measure how professional journalistic practitioners are through a national sample of TV journalists. Fortunately, however, LeRoy goes an important step beyond McLeod & Hawley in that he uses measures of professionalization that had been applied to other occupational groups. In general, journalists came out about as professional as librarians. Stockbrokers were the most professionalized, lawyers ranked fifth, advertising personnel seventh, physicians eighth, personnel managers tenth, engineers eleventh and journalists nineth. LeRoy found that television journalists did not look to formal groups as reference points (25th of 27 occupations here), were somewhat supportive of self-regulation (17 of 27 occupations on this factor), relatively low in calling to their field (25 of 27), moderate in sense of autonomy in work (14 of 27) but extremely high in commitment to public service (3 of 27). In these five areas, television journalists fell below the median of all occupations in four of five instances. Traditional professions, law and medicine, hovered about the median rank. LeRoy concluded that there was "a crude sort of professionalism" among the journalists he studied, at least relative to other occupations. LeRoy, Levels of Professionalism in a Sample of Television Newsmen, 17 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 193 (1974).

In a less sophisticated way, Weinthal & O'Keefe applied McLeod's techniques to working broadcast journalists in Denver, CO. They focused their attention on the desire to implement professional standards, amount of criticism of station, willingness to leave broadcast journalism, education, organizational membership and some on-the-job behaviors. Like previous researchers, they found some broadcast journalists more professionalized than others, and generally similar to print journalists. Weinthal & O'Keefe Professionalism Among Broadcast Newsmen in an Urban Area, 18 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 193 (1974).

The most recent study of journalist professionalism, as well as many other interesting aspects of the life of the working press, is JOHNSTONE, SLAWSKI & BOWMAN, THE NEWS PEOPLE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PORTRAIT OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND THEIR WORK (1976). They tackle the professionalism issue two ways. From a primarily historical analysis they conclude that journalism is something of a profession: it is full-time; there are training facilities for practitioners; there are professional associations; formal codes of ethics and "legal sanction, of a kind, for its work territory." Id. at 102. They also found that attitudinally, journalists tended to place importance on being able to work independently and on the service aspects of their work, de-emphasized monetary rewards and other tangible benefits. Id. at 111. They found, however, mixed data on use of professional groups as reference points. Formal professional groups were primarily used only by those already established in the field, and then but weakly used. Informal groups and contacts among co-workers was a trait of journalists moving up in the field, of broadcast journalists, and of journalists in large communities. Like everyone else, Johnstone et. al. conclude that journalists are somewhat professionalized, calling them semi-professionals or emerging professionals.

A final study related to broadcast professionalism is Idsvoog & Hoyt, Professionalism and Performance of Television Journalists, 21 JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING 97 (1977). These authors apply McLeod measures to television journalists in six Wisconsin markets. Their main interest, however, is not in measuring professionalism but rather in testing an often associated assumption; namely that professional journalists are more skillful than non-professionals. Skill was measured by ability to edit a newsfilm script. The authors conclude that skill is directly related to degree of professionalism.

67. 29 U.S.C. sec. 159 (b)(1) (1970).

68. 29 U.S.C. sec. 152 (12) (1970).

69. Jersey Publishing Company, 76 NLRB 467 (1948).

70. Id. at 469.

71. Id.

72. Free Press Company, 76 NLRB 1047 (1948). There appear to have been no cases yet involving the professionalism of broadcast journalists, but broadcast announcers were determined not to professional employees in West Central Broadcasting, Co., 77 NLRB 366 (1948). Some broadcast engineers, usually those experimenting with new broadcast equipment, have however been determined to be professional employees. See Southwestern Sales Corp., 93 NLRB 936 (1951) and Southern Radio and Television Equipment Co., 107 NLRB 216 (1953).

73. Express-News Corporation, 223 NLRB 627 (1976).

74. Id., at 628.

75. Id.

76. Id., at 629.

77. Id. at 631. The Express-News holding has been followed in Binghamton Press Co., Inc. 226 NLRB No. 109 (1976).

78. Another area of the law which suggests that journalists are not professionals is that of privilege. Many professional groups are accorded privilege by statute, others have been granted it by case law. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, at the very least, journalists could gain a testimonial privilege only if one were created for them by statute. The court rejected notions that the privilege might be appropriate because of the professional nature of journalist, or on the basis of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

79. Speech of Dr. David Hubbard, Aberrant Behavior Center, Dallas at RTNDA Annual Convention, San Francisco, September 17, 1977. From audio tape of the session.

80. The sample consisted of 250 news directors chosen with equal probability of entry from Broadcasting Yearbook, 1977. The questionnaires were mailed November 30, 1077. On December 17, 1977, 193 follow-up questionnaires were mailed. Eventually 115 usable responses were received, for a response rate of 47%. This would not normally be considered a highly successful response rate, but news personnel are notoriously hard to survey and this rate really appears to be above average. LeRoy, for example, had a 40% response rate with an original questionnaire and two follow-ups. LeRoy, supra n. 66 at 54. He reports this response rate as "similar to the levels reached by other surveys of broadcasting personnel." Id. at 62, n. 12. Considering the holiday season, this response is considered quite satisfactory. The respondents are representative of the universe at large in terms of proportions of network affiliated, independent and public TV stations. Large markets are slightly underrepresented, a problem also encountered by LeRoy.

A copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix B.

The author was assisted in the design and executive of the survey by the following graduate students in R500, Research Methods in Telecommunications; Barbara Jackson, Penny Legate, Cynthia Lont, Karen Merz, Cristopher Roberge, Ivy Shih, James Smith and Tim Walker. Their assistance is appreciated, but the author remains responsible for the survey findings and interpretation.

81. The data suggests that public television respondents are probably not representative of public television in general. It is quite unlikely, for example, that 29.4% of public stations (5 of 17 respondents) have live microwave capability, although that is the survey figure. It is suspected that returns from public stations came from the most sophisticated public TV stations and that non-sophisticated public TV stations did not respond at all. Since public TV stations are represented in about the proper proportion in the overall returns, it must be the case that sophisticated public TV stations were more interested in responding

to the survey -- perhaps to demonstrate their sophistication with and interest in news -- than was true of "average" commercial stations. In any event, all data reported hereafter will use only the data from commercial stations, usually combining both network affiliated and independent stations.

82. Relationships significant at the p = .05 level will be reported as statistically significant with relationships significant at the p = .10 level commented upon. Non-significant relationships will not be reported. Reactions to these questions were also compared, as will be discussed, with reactions to questions about professionalism and reactions in hypothetical coverage situations.

83. One survey of television news directors and police chiefs from the nation's "30 major cities" found a high degree of support for the seven CBS Guidelines. CBS New's Ground Rules for Terrorist Coverage Backed by Peers, Law Enforcers, 93 BROADCASTING 42 (November 7, 1977). The methodology of this study is unclear -- it may be that respondents were simply asked if they supported or opposed the guidelines, and opposing these is a bit like opposing motherhood -- the scale is not adequately sensitive if that procedure was used. The response rate among news directors was only 35%. See n. 80 supra.

84. See supra., n. 57. The questionnaire was prepared before the UPI National Broadcast Advisory Board released its modified version of the general UPI guidelines. Accordingly, this survey response is to a hard-line position not taken by the Broadcast Advisory Board. It suggests that the board may have known that broadcast journalists in general would not support such a hard-line position on journalists as intermediaries. Often broadcast journalists get scoops by offering to substitute themselves for hostages. See In Brief, 94 BROADCASTING 26 (January 2, 1978) for a story where two Chicago TV newsmen became involved as intermediaries, and one of the newsmen was exchanged for two hostages. According to the story, the two newsmen talked the gunman into giving himself up to police.

85. Supra., n. 66.

86. It was hoped that these nine statements might be used as a simple additive scale of professionalism and, for that matter, that the twelve statements about terrorism coverage might also be summed to equal a kind of scale of support for controls over coverage of terrorism-hostage taking situations. On examination, neither scale seems too useful or reliable so the statements have been discussed singly. With a bit of refinement, however, each set might be worked into an adequate scale. Each of the nine professionalism items contributes positively to the summed professionalism scale and all of the correlations between the total and each individual item are significant at the .01 level or less. However, of the 36 possible unique intercorrelations, only 13 are statistically significant at the .05 level or less and those intercorrelations are all relatively modest.

The same is generally true of the terrorism-hostage taking items,

where nine of the 12 items contribute to the total as expected at the .01 level and where two of the 12 contribute at the .05 level. One item does positively correlate, but only at the .09 level. Of the 66 unique intercorrelations, however, only 16 are statistically significant at the .05 level or less. Four of these are negative, and all are relatively modest.

For these reasons, plus the fact that when means of these items are examined it can be seen that -- particulary with the professionalism items -- we are not talking about items with which there is strong agreement or disagreement (again testimony to the modestly professionalized nature of broadcast journalists most likely) it was decided not to do much with the summed professionalism or terrorist-hostage attitude scores. For the benefit of future researchers, however, it might be noted that the correlation between these scores is .5275, n=85, sig. = .001 but, given the low number of intercorrelations within each summed score, little should be made of this statistical finding.

87. Statistics will be reported as they were for the terrorism-hostage items, supra., n. 82.

88. This was, of course, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 46 LW 5018 (1978), the so-called "Seven Dirty Words" case. Given the outcome of that case, some broadcasters might be more cautious today.

89. McLeod & Hawley, Professionalization Among Newsmen, 41 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 529, 535 (1964).

90. See FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 87-203 (1977) and cases cited therein. Most recently, see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 46 LW 4830 (1978), ops. C.J. Burger and J. Stewart.

91. In some respects the situation is analogous to the limits that judges may place on access to criminal justice information to preserve a fair trial. Prior restraint is very difficult to justify, but through control over officers of the court, judges can limit access to news to assure a fair trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 49 L.Ed. 2d 683 (1976).

92. H.R. 1576, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.

93. See Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 35 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1177 (1975).

94. 41 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1311 (1977), cert. den., 46 L.W. 3734 (1978).

95. The Fairness Doctrine places two obligations on broadcasters: (1) to cover controversial issues of public importance in their community and (2) to provide "reasonable opportunity" for the expression of opposing viewpoints on those issues. See generally, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 FCC 2d 1, 30 P. & F. Radio Reg. 1261 (1974). The

doctrine has traditionally been viewed as intended to assure that the public is fully informed rather than as a protection of any right for an individual or group to gain access to the airwaves to present their views. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

96. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 41 P & F Radio Reg. 2d. 1311, 1335 (1977).

97. BC Docket No. 78-60, FCC 78-108.

98. Fenyvesi, Looking into the Muzzle of Terrorists, 65 QUILL 16, 17 (July-August, 1977).

99. See generally COLE, THE RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE (1978).

100. Hostage Incident Training Proposed for Journalists, 32 RTNDA COMMUNICATOR 9 (February, 1978).

APPENDIX A: CBS NEWS' GUIDELINES PRESS RELEASE

CBS
NEWS
(Letterhead)

April 14, 1977

CBS NEWS ISSUES GUIDELINES FOR COVERAGE OF TERRORISTS

Production guidelines to be followed by CBS News in its "coverage of terrorists" were issued April 7, 1977 by CBS News President Richard S. Salant. These guidelines, now included as part of CBS News Standards, are as follows:

Coverage of Terrorists

Because the facts and circumstances of each case vary, there can be no specific self-executing rules for the handling of terrorist/hostage stories. CBS News will continue to apply the normal tests of news judgment and if, as so often they are, these stories are newsworthy, we must continue to give them coverage despite the dangers of "contagion." The disadvantages of suppression are, among things, (1) adversely affecting our credibility ("What else are the news people keeping from us?"); (2) giving free rein to sensationalized and erroneous word of mouth rumors; and (3) distorting our news judgments for some extraneous judgmental purpose. These disadvantages compel us to continue to provide coverage.

Nevertheless in providing for such coverage there must be thoughtful, conscientious care and restraint. Obviously, the story should not be sensationalized beyond the actual fact of its being sensational. We should exercise particular care in how we treat the terrorist/kidnapper.

More specifically:

(1) An essential component of the story is the demands of the terrorist/kidnapper and we must report those demands. But we should avoid providing an excessive platform for the terrorist/kidnapper. Thus, unless such demands are succinctly stated and free of rhetoric and propaganda, it may be better to paraphrase the demands instead of presenting them directly through the voice or picture of the terrorist/kidnapper.

(2) Except in the most compelling circumstances, and then only with the approval of the President of CBS News, or in his absence, the Senior Vice President of News, there should be no live coverage of the terrorist/kidnapper since we may fall into the trap of providing an unedited platform for him. (This does not limit live on-the-spot reporting by CBS News reporters, but care should be exercised to assure restraint and context.)

(3) News personnel should be mindful of the probable need by the authorities who are dealing with the terrorist for communication by telephone and hence should endeavor to ascertain, wherever feasible, whether our own use of such lines would be likely to interfere with the authorities' communications.

(4) Responsible CBS News representatives should endeavor to contact experts dealing with the hostage situation to determine whether they have any guidance on such questions as phraseology to be avoided, what kinds of questions or reports might tend to exacerbate the situation, etc. Any such recommendations by established authorities on the scene should be carefully considered as guidance (but not as instruction) by CBS News personnel.

(5) Local authorities should also be given the name or names of CBS personnel whom they can contact should they have further guidance or wish to deal with such delicate questions as a newsman's call to the terrorists or other matters which might interfere with authorities dealing with the terrorists.

(6) Guidelines affecting our coverage of civil disturbances are also applicable here, especially those which relate to avoiding the use of inflammatory catchwords or phrases, the reporting of rumors, etc. As in the case of policy dealing with civil disturbances, in dealing with a hostage story, reporters should obey all police instructions but report immediately to their superiors any such instructions that seem to be intended to manage or suppress the news.

(7) Coverage of this kind of story should be in such overall balance as to length, that it does not unduly crowd out other important news of the hour/day.

* * *

APPENDIX B: MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE USED WITH TV NEWS DIRECTORS

Note: Questionnaire was printed on both sides of colored paper and folded in half to make an attractive four page booklet.

19. How long have you worked at your present position? _____

20. How long have you worked in broadcast journalism? _____

21. How long have you worked in journalism generally? _____

PART IV: YOUR CHANCE TO EXPRESS YOUR OPINION ON SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES.

Listed below are several statements on which people have different opinions. We want to know yours. Indicate it by circling the "X" under the response that best matches your opinion.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
22. A newsman may allow the pressures of time to affect the accuracy of his story	X	X	X	X	X
23. A part of a newsman's role is to be responsible to the public	X	X	X	X	X
24. The need for a workable relationship with supervisors or management means newsmen may have to alter their beliefs or principles	X	X	X	X	X
25. It's important for broadcasters to have written codes to follow	X	X	X	X	X
26. A journalist should continue to work for a station even if he disagrees with its editorial policy	X	X	X	X	X
27. The working newsmen of a broadcast station have a legitimate right to help determine content and news policies	X	X	X	X	X
28. The working newsman should be required, periodically, to take refresher courses at nearby colleges or universities	X	X	X	X	X
29. One of the broadcast station's goals should be daily comprehensive and complete news coverage	X	X	X	X	X
30. There should be a respected organization of journalists that certifies other new journalists to insure the qualifications, training and competence of those who practice journalism	X	X	X	X	X
31. Live coverage of terrorist/hostage situations incites more such incidents	X	X	X	X	X
32. Live "ENG" equipment has made it harder for broadcast journalists to cover the news responsibly	X	X	X	X	X
33. Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist/hostage situation is likely to encourage the spread of rumors	X	X	X	X	X
34. Failure to broadcast all the news of a terrorist/hostage situation is likely to reduce credibility of the broadcast media	X	X	X	X	X
35. It is better to have reporters report terrorist demands than to let the terrorists on the air themselves	X	X	X	X	X
36. Journalists must remember that activities like calling terrorists on the phone may disrupt proper police activities	X	X	X	X	X
37. Experts in terrorist/hostage negotiations should be consulted for guidance on how to cover a situation without exacerbating it	X	X	X	X	X
38. Journalists should give police the names of "key" reporters to contact if police want to offer guidance on coverage	X	X	X	X	X
39. If terrorist stories are newsworthy they must be covered	X	X	X	X	X
40. Reporters should never be intermediaries between terrorists and police	X	X	X	X	X
41. "Common sense" is a workable guide for covering terrorists	X	X	X	X	X
42. Competition from other media can make it harder to cover terrorist/hostage situations responsibly	X	X	X	X	X

Code Number _____

TERRORISM / HOSTAGE SURVEY

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the questions below based on your knowledge or opinion. If a question does not apply to you, of if you don't know the answer, just leave the question unanswered. Put a check mark in the boxes in front of each response you choose. Generally, check only one response per question. Check more than one only when instructed to do so. Watch for instances where you may be instructed to skip some questions. Try and ignore the numbers in front of the responses, they will be used later to put this information into the computer.

PART I: SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR NEWS FACILITIES AND POLICIES.

1. Which of the following pieces of equipment are available, on demand, at your station for news uses? (Check all that apply.)

   1. [] Film camera(s).
   2. [] Film processor(s).
   3. [] Remote truck(s) -- but not "ENG" type.
   4. [] Portable "ENG" video tape recorder(s) and camera(s).
   5. [] Microwave equipment for sending picture and sound from field to studio, with potential for live use.

2. Has your station adopted written codes for handling terrorist/hostage coverage?

   1. [] Yes (Answer questions 2a and 2b, but then skip to question 3)
   2. [] No (Skip questions 2a and 2b, but answer 2c and then go to question 3).

   2a. What was the primary source for the code you adopted?

   1. [] We developed it alone (just our station).
   2. [] We developed it in cooperation with other stations in our market.
   3. [] We're group-owned and the group developed it.
   4. [] We modeled it on a network code.
   5. [] We modeled it on a code of a professional broadcasting organization (e.g., the NAB, RTNDA, state broadcaster associations).
   6. [] We modeled it on a code of a non-network news supplier (e.g., AP, UPI).
   7. [] We developed it in cooperation with local authorities.

   2b. What was the primary (just one) reason you adopted a terrorist/hostage code when you did?

   2c. What's your station's present posture toward a terrorist/hostage code?

   1. [] We are actively writing such a code now.
   2. [] We are considering, but not writing, it now.
   3. [] We considered writing a code, but decided against it.
   4. [] We have never considered writing a code, but may do so.
   5. [] We have never considered writing a code, and probably won't do so.

3. Assuming that codes are almost inevitable in broadcasting, what kind do you personally prefer?

   1. [] A code that is very specific and mandatory (must always be followed).
   2. [] A code that is very specific but not mandatory (may sometimes not be followed).
   3. [] A code that gives general guidelines, but is mandatory.
   4. [] A code that gives general guidelines and is not mandatory.

4. Would you be willing to get together with other broadcasters in your market to write a terrorist/hostage code?

   1. [] Yes.
   2. [] No.

5. If terrorist/hostage codes are adopted, who so you think should adopt them? (Check all that apply.)

1. [] The Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
2. [] The networks (include PBS).
3. [] Station groups.
4. [] Professional broadcasting organizations (e.g., NAB, RTNDA, State assns.)
5. [] Non-network news suppliers (AP, UPI).
6. [] Individual stations.
7. [] All stations in a market on a market-wide basis.
8. [] There's no need for any of the above to adopt terrorist/hostage codes.

PART II: NOW SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW YOU'VE HANDLED, OR MIGHT HANDLE, CERTAIN NEWS SITUATIONS.

6. Have you or your station ever covered a terrorist/hostage situation live?

1. [] Yes (Answer question 6a, skip 6b, and go to 7).
2. [] No (Skip 6a, answer 6b and then go to 7).

6a. Why did you cover the situation live? (Check all that apply and then circle the most important reason.)

1. [] Terrorist demands for live coverage.
2. [] Request by local authorities for live coverage.
3. [] To serve the public interest.
4. [] Because the competition was covering it live.
5. [] Because it was newsworthy.

6b. Why did you not cover the situation live? (Check all that apply and then circle the most important reason.)

1. [] Because we've never had such a situation to cover.
2. [] We didn't want to give in to terrorist demands for coverage.
3. [] We didn't want to grant demands by authorities for coverage.
4. [] It wouldn't be in the public interest.
5. [] Our competition wasn't covering it live.
6. [] It wasn't newsworthy.

7. If your station got in the position where a decision had to be made about interrupting entertainment programming (or regular non-news programming) to cover a terrorist/hostage situation live, who is the lowest ranking employee who could make that decision and execute it without consulting anybody else?

1. [] The General or Station Manager.
2. [] News Director.
3. [] A news producer.
4. [] A news anchorperson.
5. [] A reporter.
6. [] Somebody else (describe)_____

NOTE: The next six questions are "hypotheticals." Answer them in terms of what you would generally like to do in the circumstances.

8. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation live and the parties involved start to use offensive (not necessarily obscene or indecent, just offensive) language. You would be most likely to...

1. [] Halt live coverage altogether.
2. [] Keep the video, halt audio, and have reporter or anchor explain what's happening.
3. [] Let the language on, but with apologies from reporter or anchorperson.
4. [] Just let it run on as it is -- do nothing else.

9. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation live and there's a good chance that somebody may be physically hurt or murdered on camera. You would most likely...

1. [] Continue live coverage as it is.
2. [] Switch frequently to the anchorperson or reporter and hope it would happen while that person was off camera.
3. [] Stop the live coverage and have the reporter or anchor tell what's happening.

10. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation and police ask you to withold information they claim would harm lives if released. You would most likely...

1. [] Comply totally with the police request.
2. [] Report all the information anyway.
3. [] Report what you felt the public had a right to know, but withold some.

11. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation and police ask you to broadcast information you know is false, saying that it would help save lives. You would most likely...

1. [] Broadcast the false information.
2. [] Broadcast the information, but saying that police had asked you to do it.
3. [] Broadcast the information, say police asked you to do it, and say it's false.
4. [] Broadcast a report that the police had asked you to broadcast false information.
5. [] Broadcast neither the information not any report about the police request.

12. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation and police ask you to broadcast a "press conference" of the terrorist, saying that it would help save lives. You would most likely...

1. [] Broadcast the press conference, no strings attached.
2. [] Broadcast the press conference, but make it known to the terrorist that you might cut it off.
3. [] Broadcast the press conference only if you did not have to do it live.
4. [] Not broadcast the press conference at all.

13. You are covering a terrorist/hostage situation and police ask you to limit your contacts to one official police source, saying that it would help save lives. You would most likely...

1. [] Go along and use only that source.
2. [] Use that source, but also any others that seemed appropriate.
3. [] Ignore that source and use others.

14. Now, look back over questions 9-13. Have any of these situations actually been situations you or your station has faced?

1. [] No.
2. [] Yes. IF YES, write below the question number(s) of the situation(s) you have faced, and for each, tell briefly what you actually did.

PART III: NOW SOME FACTUAL QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU AND YOUR STATION.

15. Check all statements below that apply to your station.

1. [] ABC affiliate.
2. [] CBS affiliate.
3. [] NBC affiliate.
4. [] Independent commercial station.
5. [] Non-commercial, educational (but not PBS member)
6. [] Non-commercial, educational (PBS member).
7. [] Subscriber to UPI services.
8. [] Subscriber to AP services.
9. [] NAB member.
10. [] NAB TV Code subscriber.

16. Check all statements below that apply to you personally.

1. [] RTNDA member.
2. [] Sigma Delta Chi, Society of Professional Journalists member.
3. [] Member of a local professional journalistic organization that's not a local chapter of one of the above.

17. Your age.

1. [] 20 or less.
2. [] 21-30 years.
3. [] 31-40 years.
4. [] 41-50 years.
5. [] 51-60 years.
6. [] 61-70 years.
7. [] 71 or older.

18. Your job title?_____